A REPLY TO A Vindication OF A DISCOURSE

Concerning the

Unreasonableness of a New Separation, &c.

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AMONG all the Reformed Churches, none departed from *Rome* with greater Advantage than the Church of *England*. The certain Succeſſion of Authority, as well as purity of Doctrine, and both maintained by Men as famous for the Integrity of their Lives, as Profoundneſs of their Learning, made her for a long time the Glory of the Reformation, and both the Envy and Terror of her Adverſaries. For this Reaſon ſhe became the principal Mark, at which all Firebrands were darted; and no Arts were neglected, which might by any means raiſe up Enemies againſt her, till in the former Rebellion, overwhelmed with the Multitude, Malice, and Wickedneſs of her Foes, either her Preiſts, with others, were barbarouſly murdered, or ſhut out from the Temples, and debarr'd from the daily Sacrifice: And *Jeruſalem* it ſelf was made an heap of Stones. But though this did eclipſe her Beauty, and (as ſome thought) well nigh defac'd her, yet ſuch was the Sincerity of her Members, that thoſe bloody Perſecutions did indeed raiſe her Reputation; and made many, who admired their Conſtancy, enquire into thoſe Principles, from whence ſprang ſuch wonderful Effects; whereby ſhe gained no few Proſelytes: And as, when the Heathens, accounting all ſure, erected Statues to *Diocleſian*, with this Inſcription, *Superſtitione Chriſti ubiq; deleta*, the Chriſtian Church ſoon after broke forth with greater Splendor than ever; ſo when our Enemies thought they had raked up that long afflicted Church in Aſhes, on a ſudden, and beyond hopes, ſhe roſe with ſuch a Luſtre as ſtruck Envy dumb, and her Enemies with Admiration, as ſeeing the Finger of God in it. And thus it might have long continued, had there not been a falling away, and her own Members renounced her Principles. But, alas! now her Condition is worſe and more deſperate than ever, unleſs God be her Helper. *Rome* hugs herſelf, and laughs to ſee the Members of that Church debauched, and that effected by ſome few Vipers bred in her Bowels, which all their Craft and Induſtry could never bring to paſs. The Diſſenters ſmile and inſult, to ſee the worſt of their Principles taken up, and pretended to have been always Principles of the Church of *England*. And as for thoſe few, whom no Plagues or Penalties can force to abdicate their Mother, and with Rancour vomit up that Divine Food they ſuckt from her Breaſts; whilſt even their Enemies commiſerate them, thoſe who call themſelves their Brethren proſecute them with the utmoſt Malice, as if nothing would ſerve them but *Root and Branch*, and they were fully reſolved to deſtroy that poor diſtreſſed Church, *both Name and Thing*: And unleſs God of his Infinite Mercy prevent their implacable Deſigns, to the eye of Senſe it ſcarce ſeems avoydable.

Experience may have ſufficiently taught us, That Schiſm not only breeds ill Blood, but worſe Actions; and not only cauſeth Heats and Animoſities, but often raiſeth Men to that Madneſs of Zeal, that they think they do God good Service by the moſt unjuſtifiable Deeds, and barbarous Immanities; and I pray God that theſe times may not too much feel the Effects of it. Upon this account every good Man will not only Mourn over the Diviſions of *Reuben*, but by all honeſt Means endeavour to allay them: And if I could be convinced, That the

Guilt of the preſent Schiſm lay at our Door, I ſhould think it ought to be my firſt Work to Repent of it. And thô the Author I have to do with writes at that rate, as if he intended not to convince any Man, but reproach all, who are not of his Party; yet I will paſs that by, and do him the Juſtice to examine whatever may ſeem in the leaſt material thorough his whole Diſcourſe, and ſo leave the Judgment to the Impartial Reader.

For a taſte, at firſt, what awkard doings we muſt expect all along, he anſwers my little Piece backwards, and begins at the end. And becauſe I ſaid I was unwilling to *judge ſeverely of my Brethren*, he thinks he hath no ſmall advantage in picking up three or four harſh Phraſes, which dropt from my Pen: As if a Man could have no kindneſs for others, who ſometimes ſpeaks in ſharp Language, when bitter Truth enforceth him to it, and the Nature of the Thing will not be otherwiſe expreſſed. But this Complaint very ill becomes him, who at every turn, on ſet purpoſe, calls me by all the ſcornful, deſpicable Names, a malicious Wit can invent; and ſometimes gives me ſuch ill-favoured Titles, with Threatning to boot, as if he had a mind to deal by me, as the Heathens with the Primitive Chriſtians, who, when they would expoſe them to be torn in pieces, dreſt them in the Skins of Bears, or other Savage Beaſts. But this I can neglect: For though it may recommend his Book to ſome kind of Wits, yet it will certainly diſparage it with all Men of Senſe.

My Anſwer contained only two Sheets, ſo that it could be neither difficult nor tedious to have anſwered it as it lay: But, as if he were loſt in a Wood, or had to do with ſome Voluminous Author, he reduceth it to Heads; but as there I followed another Man's Steps, ſo here, to prevent all Complaints of foul play, ſeeing our Author will not allow me my own Method, I will follow his. But firſt, I cannot forbear to tell him, That I do not think that he hath done like an ingenuous Man in theſe things. 1. That he hath quite omitted ſeveral Reaſons of mine, which were material as to the Matter in Controverſy. 2. That when he mentions Topicks, or hints at any of my Arguments, he never repeats thoſe Words wherein the ſtrength of the Argument lay. 3. That he rarely makes any direct Anſwer; but ſhifts and turns it off to another Matter, like ſome crafty Huntſmen, who being deſirous to ſave the life of an old chac'd Hare, and yet to gull thoſe who follow the Sport, and think the ſame Game is ſtill on foot, ſtart, and lay the Dogs into a freſh one. And in theſe three things conſiſts both the Artifice and Strength (if it have any) of his whole Book.

The firſt Topick he makes to be of *Church-Communion and Schiſme*; and here the firſt Offer he makes is a Side-blow, in ſtiling us the *New Separatiſts*, (*p.* 3.) Now Schiſme certainly goes along with the Cauſe; and thoſe properly are the Schiſmaticks who are the Criminals: Now let Matters be firſt adjuſted, and the Cauſe examined, and let thoſe be the new *Separatiſts* who ſhall be found Guilty upon Tryal; and if his new Titles of Honour be not found of Right to belong to himſelf and his Party, I will confeſs that I have been wofully miſtaken.

That we *do not fall, but are forced into this Diviſion*, I had alledged. This he ſaith he will anſwer in due place, and I muſt wait his Leiſure. But when he calls it a *Spiteful Return*, when I deſire that Author to *ſpeak with more Reverence of a Caſe of Conſcience*, if he had withal added my Reaſons, it would have plainly appeared that nothing but frontleſs Impudence would have called that Spitefulneſs. But to divert the Diſcourſe, he tells me, That I have *over-run the Point*. For (ſaith he) *the Word Only is not as if a Caſe of Conſcience was not a*

matter

matter of Conſequence; but that the taking or not taking the Oaths, is only a Caſe of Conſcience, not matter of Doctrine. But doth not the Strength of his Argument lye in this, That the taking or not taking the Oaths is only a Caſe of Conſcience, about which wiſe and good Men may differ? And doth not he by this means endeavour to repreſent it as a Matter of ſmall Moment or Importance? and I think this is not to make it a Matter of any great Conſequence. Or do I there ſpeak any thing of Doctrine, but ſtrictly keep my ſelf to the Plea of a Caſe of Conſcience? Was not my principal Reaſon this, That there was not any Moral Action, and conſequently not any Duty of a Chriſtian, about which a Caſe of Conſcience might not at one time or other ariſe? And if theſe may be determined either way, becauſe wiſe and good Men may differ, this will either deſtroy the very nature of Good & Evil, or make the Bounds ſo moveable, that we ſhall never know certainly where to find them. But becauſe theſe and other Reaſons deſerve no Anſwer, let us ſee whether he hath made the matter better or worſe by what he will vouchſafe us. It is only *a Caſe of Conſcience*, (he ſays) *not Matter of Doctrine.* What is the meaning of this? Doth he think practical Caſes things indifferent, and that nothing is of moment but matter of Theory? Provided that a Man doth believe in general that Oaths are obligatory, is it lawful for him in practice to take contradictory Oaths, and be guilty of Perjury? I confeſs, That I ſhould have a better Opinion of the Quaker, who denies the Lawfulneſs of all Oaths, than of that Man who maintains the Lawfulneſs of Breaking all Oaths: The one may prevent Perjury, the other encourageth it without end. But if Men put ſuch a Senſe upon promiſſory Oaths, as, contrary to their Nature and Deſign, makes them to be no Security, I leave it to indifferent Perſons to judge, whether that Man doth not in effect invalidate all promiſſory Oaths, and ſet up ſuch a Doctrine as teacheth the Lawfulneſs to break them: And I think we need not go far to ſeek Men who do thus. But this Oath (he ſays) is a *Matter of a Civil Nature.* What then? Is not God appealed to in the taking it? Is not his holy Name profaned, and his Wrath and Vengeance provoked, if it be taken in Violation of former Oaths, *i.e.* in Perjury? What if its Meaning be to be learnt from the *Conſtitution and Laws of the Realm?* Has it not therefore a certain Senſe and Meaning? And if there be Sin in it, is it not a ſufficient ground to refuſe to communicate in that Sin, or to joyn with perjured Perſons in their Perjury? But here he ſhamelefly inſinuates, That the Matter of our Difference is only Scruples; when I had told him, as plainly as a Man could ſpeak, That we had no Scruples. If a Man ſhould encourage me to murther my Father, or rob him of all he hath, ſhould I make any Scruple to reject the Council of ſuch a Villain? I think there is as little Reaſon for a Man to raiſe Scruples why he may not forſwear himſelf, as why he may not commit Theft, Murther, or Adultery. He ſcarce deſerves the Name of a Chriſtian, who doth not, without any Scruple, condemn theſe Sins.

After this ſhift, he next puts two Pleas in our Mouths, and then makes two Anſwers for his learned Author. The Firſt Plea is, *That when any Thing unlawful is made a condition of Communion it will juſtify a Separation.* As to which he tells us, his Author made Anſwer, *That taking the Oaths is no condition of Communion with us, and ſhewed that the Terms of our Communion are not altered.* This, indeed, he ſaid, but he never ſhewed or proved, nor ever can. For will he ſay, That the matter of the Oaths is not made a condition of Communion to all Men? Are we not obliged to pray for the ſame thing in more ample, plain, and ſignicant Terms, than we are to ſwear it?

Now

Now whatever Objections we have againſt the Oath, our principal Objection is againſt the matter of it, as unduely, and unjuſtly aſſigned; and if the Owning and Praying for this be made a part of the daily Office, it is made a condition of our Communion; and if ſo, then the terms of our Communion are altered. And thus he may ſee that a Man may ſooner prove the Oaths to be made conditions of Communion, then tell of forty Things they are not: But this will be done more fully afterwards.

As to the Second Objection, he tells us his Author ſays, *That it is the Scruple about mix'd Communion, which hath been ſo long exploded among us*; and this he ſays, *I was very careful to paſs over in ſilence:* And perhaps he did not very adviſedly to be my remembrance: For I will not paſs it over ſo now. For ſhould I ſuffer that to lye againſt us, I ſhould expoſe both my ſelf, and others to a ſevere Cenſure. But I have known Boys ſet up a *Daſtin*, and then ſtrangely laugh and tryumph to ſee how bravely they knockt it down again; and when other Men make our Objections for us they may frame them on purpoſe ſo as to faſten on them ſome ridiculous Conſequences, which they had before in their Head; and that indeed may make them Sport, but it doth not affect us: And I cannot think that this Author did believe himſelf, when he caſt this Calumny upon us, as think us ſo very Weak and Silly to ſeperate upon the Terms of thoſe Enthuſiaſts, who thought themſelves Defiled in mix'd Communions. Had he ſtated the Objection fairly, there had been no colour for his Anſwer: But ſince he is reſolved to caſt all Slanders upon us, I ſhall briefly repreſent our Senſe in this Caſe, which will be ſufficient to wipe them off. We do not ſeperate from them upon the account of any particular Frailties, or any perſonal Infirmities, or Sins. We do not ſeperate from them for that they have taken unlawful Oaths, though we think them bad Men for doing ſo; and worſe for hardening themſelves in their Sin by maintaining them, and encouraging others to be as bad as themſelves; good Offices may be diſcharged by ill Perſons, if lawfully authorized thereto; and where the Terms of the Communion are Sound, the particular perſonal Failings of a Man, in other matters, affects not the Communion; both *Judas* and *Demas* may execute their Office to the benefit of others, though it were to be wiſhed, that ſcandalous Sins were leſs rife in the World; for a fulſome Cup is apt to turn the Stomack againſt the moſt wholeſome Liquour; and Devotion is apt to grow chill, when the Offices of the Communion are diſcharged by a Perſon, whoſe ordinary Actions are known to be Wicked, and diſagreeable to his Official Preſcriptions; but, yet this will not Warrant the violation of Communion. But the reaſon, why we Communicate not with you is, becauſe we cannot do it without being guilty of Sin in ſo doing, which I have already in part proved from theſe two Heads; Firſt, That we are unjuſtly diſcharged from the Exerciſe of our Office, which we ought not to ſubmit to, but Exerciſe at our Peril, being we cannot do it otherwiſe. Secondly, That there is evil in the very Terms of your Communion; and therefore whether the Oaths be made conditions of Communion or not, we have ſufficient Ground to refuſe your Communion; and this I ſhall more fully prove hereafter, as our Author gives me Occaſion; for I am bound to follow a kind of deſultory Wit, which like a *Monkey*, in a drying Room, is always leaping from one Line to another, and though he never ſtays long on the ſame, yet he is never long from it.

Whereas the Author againſt a New Separation had put this Caſe, *That ſuppoſing the Swearers to blame, yet if they acted according to their Conſciences, there could*

could be no reaſon for a Separation, unleſs it be lawful to ſeperate from all, who follow the dictates of an erronious Conſcience, and ſo there will be no end of Separation; to which I did reply to this effect, That though we may be bound to ſeperate from ſome erronious Conſciences, yet it doth not follow, That we may lawfully ſeperate from all. This he calls *another of my Blunders.* But to prove that we may ſeperate from ſome erronious Conſciences, (and, I think, we ought to ſeperate from no other) and yet Schiſm not be endleſs: I gave this Reaſon, *That all erronious Conſciences had not an equal influence on Communion and good Manners, ſo that it is not the erronious Conſcience, but the nature of the Thing wherein Conſcience errs, which according as it affects Communions, either requires a Seperation, or allows a continuance of Communion*; and particular inſtances I there propoſed. But as if he were afraid he ſhould burn his Fingers, he never ſaith one Word to his Blunderers Reaſons and Inſtances; and yet to give him his due, he here endeavours to ſplit the Hair. For he calls me back, and tells me that his Friends ſuppoſition was this, *That though the Swearers were to blame, yet if the Oaths were not made a condition of Communion, there could be no cauſe aſſigned for a Seperation on that account.* But if I give him this, yet it is plain Force on his part, and to make me agree to his Authors Suppoſal whether I will or no. For it was my Buſineſs to ſhew, That the Suppoſition did not lye in our Caſe; and I there not only aſſerted but proved, That the erronious Conſcience, concerning which we Diſcourſed, was ſuch as did affect Communion. Now if a Man will always ſay the ſame thing, and conſtantly hold and repeat his Concluſion, without any regard to any Arguments offered againſt it, I muſt allow that Man to have this peculiar advantage of all others, That he can never be Confuted.

I confeſs I did charge his Author, *That he had not fairly ſtated the Caſe*; and, I think ſtill, that it ought not only to have been conſidered, whether the Penalties bore any proportion to the pretended Crime, but whether the Power it ſelf had any lawful Authority either to impoſe the Oaths, or inflict the Penalties? For if that was wanting, than it is certain, That greater Iniquity and Injuſtice could ſcarce be committed, then ſuch unlawful Impoſitions, and ſuch mercyleſs Uſage. But here, to be even with me, he tells me, *That it was my Miſtake; for if there be no reaſon for the Scruples about the Oath, there can be no reaſon for their ſake to ſeperate.* (*p.* 6.) Still he is at his *Scruples*, though in effect I had before told him, That if there be ſuch a thing as Perjury, the Oaths muſt without Scruple be unlawful. But to admit his Reaſoning at preſent, yet if there be Reaſons for Scruple, and the Oaths be unlawful, than the Penalties are Unjuſt as well as Mercyleſs, and there may be Reaſon to ſeperate on their account; and, I think, this ought to have been conſidered as well as the other, and not ſuch an eaſie ſtate of the Caſe, only propounded, as if there were no more to do, but get up and ride. And yet, after all, as tryumphant as he is, his Conſequence is not univerſally Good; for though it is not our Caſe, yet there may be Caſes, wherein an Oath may be either lawfully taken, or lawfully refuſed; and though there be no Scruple in ſuch Caſe, yet a Man's Actions may be Warrantable, ſo far as tending to the Juſt and Honeſt Defence of his Liberty, when ſuch Oaths are impoſed with Unjuſt and Mercyleſs Penalties.

But it ſeems I am guilty of another miſtake; for he tells me, *That if the Oaths are Lawful, the Penalties how Unjuſt and Rigorous ſoever, cannot make them Unlawful.* But he ought to have conſidered, That I called thoſe Penalties *Mercyleſs*, in reſpect of the Diſpro-

Diſproportion; and ſuch they might be, though the Oaths were Lawful: But then I ſaid they were *Unjuſt*, in reſpect of the Unlawfulneſs of the Oaths themſelves. Now to anſwer this by ſaying, *if the Oaths are Lawful*, is meerly to beg the Queſtion, and to argue upon the Suppoſition of that, as granted, which is the Matter in diſpute.

He will needs reduce my Arguments to three Heads, of which the firſt he makes this, *That the Penalties to be inflicted upon us, want nothing of being a condition of Communion to us, quatenùs Miniſters.* Now I thought they had been inflicted already, but if they are to be inflicted, than it ſeems there are more to come, and I was more in the Right than I was aware, when I called them *Mercyleſs*, for ſo they were with a Witneſs; of which we ſhall know no end, nor from time to time what they ſhall be. To ſecure Uſurpation what in them lies, by endleſs Puniſhments, is to put the Uſurper into the place of God Almighty: For none but he can in Juſtice puniſh without end. I now begin to think, that inſtead of pittying our unjuſt Sufferings, they will inflame what they can, and get thoſe Barbarities put in Execution, which ſome have threatned, for the Warning againſt which we are more beholden to their Anger than their Honeſty.

But before he takes notice wherein my Argument pincheth him, he pretends to anſwer what I urged as the *fatal Conſequence* of ſuch Penalties. And here, with a great deal of wit, (as he thinks) he tells me, *That there may be Forty things which may have the ſame fatal Conſequence.* And if what he ſays be true, is it any Anſwer to my Argument? But let us however examine his Inſtances; and he tells us it would have been of the *ſame fatal Conſequence, if the Clergy had not ſubſcribed*, &c. *if they had not declared their Aſſent and Conſent*, &c. *if they had not taken the Oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy in former Kings Reigns*; and he might have added, if People ſhould Renounce Chriſtianity, which I fear many are ſtrongly tempted to, whilſt they hear the Miniſters of it Preach away God's Commandments, and thoſe who ought to be the ſevereſt Enemies of all Wickedneſs, to Canonize Perjury and Injuſtice for Chriſtian Virtues. But to anſwer his particular Inſtances; Will he ſay, That either the things commanded, or the Authority commanding, then was unlawful? If not, how comes it up to our Caſe; or how could they juſtly be made a ground of Separation? But he would not ſee wherein the *Fatality of the Conſequence* I urged lay; which if he had pleaſed to do, he might have ſpared all his Inſtances, though he had had Forty more. Suppoſe the Caſe thus; a Government requires ſomething to be done, which is ſinful and unlawful, with which if the Clergy will not comply, they ſhall be diſcharged from the Exerciſe of their Function and Duty. Now in ſuch a caſe, God forbids Compliance; and if they are bound to ſubmit to the Government, and ceaſe from the Exerciſe of their Miniſtry, upon Non-compliance; then it will lye in the Power of the Civil Government, whether God ſhall be worſhipped in the Land or not. For ſin we muſt not; and yet if we muſt acquieſce under the Penalty, for not complying, then it is in their Power to diſcharge every Man from his Duty: And therefore in ſuch a Caſe I ſay we muſt do our Duty at our Peril; we muſt do well, and be content to ſuffer Ill; we have no Remedy in ſuch Caſe, but to bear our Croſs. And to avoid or explode the Doctrine of the Croſs here, were in the conſequence to thruſt Chriſtianity out of the World. Of this not a word; and indeed our Author's great Skill lyes in avoiding, not anſwering, Arguments.

He farther adds, That the Penalties, though great, *are neither unjuſt or mercileſs, if the Government is not otherwiſe to be ſecured.* What! not though the thing

thing commanded be Sinful? May a Government then enjoyn Wickedneſs under the ſevereſt Penalties, if it be thought for its Security, and yet be blameleſs? There are a ſort of Men are ſtrangely careful for ſome Governments, and what a ſmall ado is required to eſtabliſh a Throne in Unrighteouſneſs, and after all, it will never be done; but either this will not ſecure the Government according to your Principles, or it may be without it. For I muſt intreate you to remember a common Diſtinction amongſt your ſelves, I mean that *between Government and Governours*; and then be pleaſed to call to mind who it is, that expreſly ſays, *That the Oath is to the Government, not to the Perſon.* Now ſuppoſe a Man ſhould take the Oaths with a deſign, at the ſame time, to ſecure the Government, by putting it into other Hands: I cannot ſee but that a Man may lawfully do thus upon your Principles; and yet this were to make an Oath the moſt deteſtable Cheat that ever was known, or heard of. Sure the Eyes of Governours will one time or other be opened to ſee, that theſe Men really ſtrip them of all Security.

All our Churches (ſaith he) *are open,* (*p.* 8.) and every one furniſhed with a bold Swearer; But what's this to the purpoſe? Or how does it anſwer the Caſe I put? For may they not on that account be ſhut at any time, and for a longer time, than they were in the Reign of King *John*? And let me deſire you, Sir, to remember, though you have ſhut us out, That the Church is not tyed to the Walls, but follows the Authority, of which we ſhall Diſcourſe anon. What he means by his Proportions of 12000. to 16000. and 2000. to 10000. I cannot imagine, unleſs it be to expoſe the Apoſtacy and Iniquity of theſe Times, which none before can parallel: If he mean to upbraid us with the fewneſs of our Number, it is only to encreaſe their own Shame and Reproach; for Argument in this Caſe, it is none, or of no Force; for it might as well have been pleaded againſt the Church in *Elijah*'s time, and he might for the ſame Reaſon have condemned all Chriſtians in general, becauſe Chriſt calls them his *Little Flock.*

Whereas I alledged and proved, *That the Oaths were made a condition of Communion to us,* quatenùs *Miniſters.* He could not deny this, only it ſeems we muſt be like Pelicans in the Wilderneſs, and none muſt come near us; *For if we will ſeparate we may, but then we muſt ſeparate alone: For the People cannot joyn with us without being guilty of a notorious Schiſm.* (*p.* 8.) But if Miniſters fall under a Deprivation, which hath neither Cauſe for the Ground, nor Authority for the Act, and conſequently is null and void in it ſelf; May not a Miniſter's own Flock joyn with him without being guilty of notorious Schiſm? And if other Miniſters will not only juſtifie ſuch unjuſt Proceedings, but greedily rob them of their Livelyhoods, and enter upon their Charges; May not thoſe, who receive the Wrong, ſeparately do their Duties? But here he objects, *That this is nothing to the People, of whom, as Church Members, this is not required. And this* (he ſays) *is a tender Point, and what I durſt not touch upon.* The Point indeed is tender; and though I had not Courage enough to ſwear, *i.e.* to be Perjured, yet my noble Hector ſhall find, that I dare do any thing that is Honeſt. It is not the Oaths in themſelves, nor their taking, or our refuſing, upon which we merely juſtifie the Separation, but it is the influence thoſe Oaths have upon Communion, and that is ſuch as will not only juſtifie, but oblige the People, as well as the Papiſts to ſeparate: And if this be ſo, then it is your ſelves muſt *Separate alone,* becauſe the People ought not to joyn with you. For though the Oaths themſelves are not impoſed on the People as condition of Communion, yet the

Matter and Subſtance of thoſe Oaths is put into the Prayers of the Church; and ſo far it becomes a condition of Communion to all Perſons. For to every Prayer the People are required to ſay *Amen*; and they are not left at their Liberty to joyn in what Prayers they will, and not in others, but are required not only to joyn, but to teſtifie their joyning in all; their Amen ſuppoſes their joynt conſent, concurrence, and approbation. What People are enjoyned in the ſolemn Worſhip to pray for, is made a condition of Communion to them; and if it be Sinful, will not only juſtifie, but require a Separation: For what I may not ſwear, though but once, I may much leſs pray for daily; nor can there be a greater affront offered to the Divine Goodneſs, than by ſolemn Prayer to endeavour to engage it for that, which, at the ſame time, I condemn as Unjuſt and Wicked. How can I joyn with thoſe, in every time of whoſe ſolemn Worſhip, I am required more then once to pray to God, that he would approve and proſper the breach of his Commandments, and moſt ſignally and notoriouſly the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth? To pray not only for that which is highly unjuſt, but alſo for the Proſperity and Continuance of it, is that which no Chriſtian ought to do; and where he is enjoyned to do it, he not only may, but ought to ſeparate from ſuch; and ſo I leave others to judge, whether there be any Reaſon for *the Peoples non Communion*, (as he Styles it.) Other Reaſons I could add, but becauſe the Author of *The Caution againſt Inconſiſtency* has clearly proved, That thoſe who think the Oaths unlawful ought, for the ſame Reaſon, to condemn the Prayers, which relate the Matter of the Oath, and conſequently ought not to joyn, where they, by being inſerted in the daily Office, are made a condition of Communion; I refer to that for more full Satisfaction in that particular. Only this I ſhall add, that in concluſion of the Church Prayers we return Thanks to God, *Who hath given us Grace with one accord to make our Prayers and Supplications.* Now let Men pretend what they will, in repeating this Prayer either they ſay true or falſe; if they ſay true, then they joyn in thoſe Prayers which contain the Matter of the Oath; but if they do not joyn in thoſe Prayers, then this Prayer is a lye in their Mouths.

Yet there is one thing more I ſhall propound, That though perſonal Failings of any Man are not a good Warrant to others to abſtain from Communion, whether nevertheleſs the Teaching, Preaching, and Maintaining Immoralities, and Opinions deſtructive of Chriſtian Practice, may not as well juſtifie a Separation from ſuch, as Errors in the Faith? For though our Adverſaries do not ſay, That Perjury is lawful, yet they argue upon ſuch Principles, as if there could hardly be any ſuch thing: They make Oaths to be no Security to any Governours, which is enough to make all Governours hate and root out that Religion which teacheth ſo. The effect of their Diſcourſe tends to the deſtroying of all Faith, Truth, and Juſtice, amongſt Mankind; than which nothing can be more ſcandalous or dangerous to that Religion, which preſcribes and requires the higheſt Simplicity and Sincerity. And this thing alone, I think, may go a great way towards juſtifying a Separation from ſuch Perſons.

From what hath been ſaid, the Anſwer is eaſie to what follows: For it is apparent, That it is not barely a Political Security required of us; *nor do we* (and God forbid either we or any others ſhould) *Revenge our Wrongs upon the Church*, as he maliciouſly inſinuates: But we preſerve our own Innocency, and, what in us lyes, by lawful and honeſt Means, the Churches Purity and juſt Authority; though we heartily mourn, That the Wickedneſs of others hath unavoidably put

put us upon the neceſſity of taking the Courſe we now do.

As to that, which he calls my ſecond Argument, he tells me in the Firſt place, That *I proceed upon a groſs Miſtake, by confounding* Deprivation *with* Degradation; and yet, with his leave, the Miſtake was not mine; for I called it Deprivation, as he doth, I never mentioned Degradation. But if the Civil Power inflict a Penalty under the name of Deprivation, which tantamounts to a Degradation, I could only argue againſt it as it was. Now, to take away a Character, and make it eternally uſeleſs, is in effect the ſame thing; and this is the Caſe; we are not only deprived of our Livelihoods, and ſhut out from our proper Cures, but perpetually diſcharged from the Exerciſe of the Miniſterial Function, unleſs we will ſin againſt the known Laws of God and the Land, and the Dictates of our own Conſciences; which we ought not, upon any account, to do: And I think this wants very little of being equivalent to a Degradation, let them call it by what Name they will. But what if the Civil Power never ſo much as thought of your Diſtinction; as I am apt to think they little Regard it? When the High-Prieſt and Rulers of the Jews firſt conſulted and reſolved amongſt themſelves, *ſtraitly to threaten the Apoſtles, That they ſpeak henceforth to no Man in this* (i. e. *Chriſt's*) *Name*, (*Act.* 4 17.) and after put their Reſolves in Execution, expreſly commanding them, *not to Speak at all, nor Teach in the Name of* Jeſus, (*verſ.* 18.) do you think they troubled their heads with your Diſtinction of *Deprivation* and *Degradation*? And how much is our Caſe different? For we are obliged, what in them lyes, either not to ſpeak in that Name, or to act contrary to it; and therefore I think we may very juſtly take up the Apoſtles Anſwer, *Whether it be right in the ſight of God, to hearken unto you, more than unto God, judge ye.* (*verſ.* 19.) When the Heathen Emperors, who ſet themſelves againſt Chriſtianity it ſelf, Baniſh'd the Biſhops, and Martyr'd others, they did but deprive them; they would not for all the World ſure have thought of degrading them. And after all, what if your new Maſters do aſſert that Power in themſelves? You know many of them are *Eraſtians*; and how much ſuch Men ſet by your Diſtinction, you can ſcarce be ignorant. But to go a little farther with you, thoſe Men who pretend to make Laws are commonly preſumed beſt to underſtand their Meaning. Now it is not long ſince, that a haughty Member of the Convention plainly told me, That it was in their power to take away our Orders, and Unprieſt and Unbiſhop us; for which he gave this worſhipful Reaſon, That the Legiſlative Power ought not to be ſtinted: And thus neither the Authority nor Eſtabliſhment of God himſelf, or his Chriſt, nor the Bounds of Good and Evil, muſt be ſuffered to ſet any Limits to a proud pragmatical Conventioner. By this you may ſee, That the Saviours you adore, reckon, That our being at any time *in Statu quo*, lyes wholly at their Mercy; and that even your ſelves, if you do not abſolutely pleaſe your new Maſters, and go through Stitch, Right or Wrong, with their Commands, can pretend to little Benefit from your Character or Orders. Beſides, I have lately heard of a Man, who hath accepted a Commiſſion to viſit all the Exempts in the City of *London*, and within Ten Miles of it; by Vertue of which, for any thing I know, a buſie Chego-pated Prieſt, may inſolently attempt to Viſit his Metropolitan: And whether this may not be improved in time to grant by Commiſſion the Exerciſe of Epiſcopal Juriſdiction to any Perſons, whom they pleaſe, without Regard to Orders, I cannot ſay, but I think it is a prety Step, and fair Advance towards it.

But be the Miſtake whoſe it will, I ſhall now try what he anſwers to the

Argument;

Argument; for it is that, which is the Concern: And here he deals moſt diſingeniouſly by me. For, Firſt, in reciting my Argument, he leaves out thoſe Words, which would have cleared my Meaning; and others, wherein the Strength of my Argument lay. Next, he Sums up my Argument falſly, and not in my Senſe: And after this, he gives no direct Anſwer to it, but raiſeth three Queſtions, and thoſe too for the ſake of ſome Anſwers he had found in Archdeacon *Maſon*; and thoſe Anſwers come not up to the Caſe. Such mighty pains are ſome Men at to ſay nothing to the purpoſe. But however we muſt wait his Motions.

My Argument he Sums up thus, *That being they (i. e.* the Clergy,*) receive their Authority from God, no Civil Power can diſable them from the Exerciſe of their Duty: And if it doth, they are bound to quit the Communion of the Church, where ſo diſabled.* Now I was ſo far from ſimply aſſerting, That the Civil Power cannot diſable them from exerciſing their Function, that I there inſtanced in Caſes where they lawfully might. But as he has worded it, he confutes himſelf. For if they exerciſe only (as he calls it) their Duty, it is certain no Civil Power lawfully can diſable them from the Exerciſe of it. And if he grant it their Duty in that Caſe, he juſtifies them: For no Man ought to be hindred from diſcharging his Duty. Nor did I ſay, That *they are bound to quit the Communion of the Church, where ſo diſabled:* For the Church might own them, when the State diſallowed them. I ſaid, in ſuch Caſe of unjuſt Deprivation, they might exerciſe their Office at their Peril; which either might be done in the Church, or in Separation from that particular Church, according as the Doctrines there taught, and the Terms of Communion in it ſtood.

The Argument being thus falſly repreſented, he anſwers it with Queſtions. The method, I ſuppoſe, is new, and he a Man in faſhion. The firſt is this, *Whether a Biſhop duly Conſecrated, or a Miniſter duly Ordained, may not be lawfully Suſpended and Deprived from the Execution of his Office, by the Secular Power, where there is ſufficient Reaſon for it?* Now this Queſtion plainly anſwers it ſelf. For I think any thing may be done, for which there is *a ſufficient Reaſon*; and he is a very hard hearted Man, who will not allow him this. But then there are other Queſtions to be asked, *viz.* What is, in ſuch Caſe, a ſufficient Reaſon? Whether there be ſufficient Reaſon in this particular Caſe? And laſtly, (if he pleaſe,) Whether no Authority in the Deprivers, and no Crime, as to them, in the Deprived, be a ſufficient Reaſon for Suſpenſion or Deprivation? It is an odd way of anſwering a Man in a particular Caſe, to float in generals, and keep as far from the Queſtion as may be; but perhaps he will mend that anon; at preſent we muſt attend to the Solution of his Queſtion, which in his Singular way he performs by reciting two Objections, and as many Anſwers to them, from Mr. *Maſon*. And, to make ſhort work, I will grant him all that *Maſon* ſays, where there is, as our Author calls it, *a ſufficient Reaſon for ſo doing*; and I hope he would not have it done without or againſt Reaſon. And ſo, paſſing by the Act of Parliament, which he hath left me to peruſe at leiſure, till I have more ſpare time, I will directly come to his ſecond Queſtion, and try whether he hath any better Fortune there.

He is not agreed with himſelf, how he ſhall word his ſecond Queſtion; and therefore I will ſet down that, where he expreſſeth himſelf moſt at large, and maintains the affirmative; *Whether it may not be lawful for the Secular Power to deprive Perſons in Orders, for Crimes committed againſt the State, and particularly, upon Refuſal to give Security to the Government for their Peaceable Behaviour and Allegiance, by Oath?* This

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he affirms, and he says *I expressly deny*; which is expressly false, as may appear from those very Words of mine, which he hath cited to prove his Assertion: For there I did allow a Deprivation by the Secular Power, where either *the just Censures of the Church had passed on any, or they did merit Deposition*; and that I think they may do, though a Censure be not actually passed upon them. But if you will have the Deprivation valid even to their acquiescence, where the Secular Power, or that which calls it self a Secular Power says, that a Crime is committed against it, you must not only justifie Queen *Mary* in Depriving *Edward* the Sixth's Bishops, but you must condemn those deprived Bishops for making a Schism, and not joyning in Communion as Laymen, *i. e.* that they did not turn Papists.

But let us examine his Defence. *I answer* (saith he) *with* Mason, *Where was the Act of the Church, in the Deposition of* Abiathar? *And where was the Ecclesiastical Crime he was charged with?* Did *Mason* then use thus to answer with Questions? But your Questions shall have Answers however; And, First, I think it not very clear whether the Jewish Church did afford so sufficient an Ecclesiastical Remedy against their Criminal High Priest, as the Christian Church doth against Criminal Bishops; and if so, then it was altogether necessary both for Church and State, that their King, who was of God's own appointment, and something more than a mere Secular Person, should interpose his Authority without any deference to Ecclesiastical Censure. Secondly, You may enquire, but I am apt to believe that neither you nor I can certainly tell, whether *Abiathar* was Censured by the Sanhedrim or not; for if it be not Recorded that he was; so neither is it that he was not. Thirdly, Though it be very convenient in it self, agreeable to the Rules of the Church, and makes much for the Peace both of Church and State, That Christian Kings in Punishing Ecclesiasticks would take the Censures of the Church along with them, which would make the Condemnation of such Persons more terrible and notorious; yet if the Clergy should refuse, as it would be their Fault, so it doth not hinder the Secular Power to punish Offenders according to Justice. But all this is nothing to the purpose, and will do him no service, because there are Cases, wherein Ecclesiasticks, Deprived by even a lawful Secular Power, may yet remain obliged to execute their Commission from Christ, though at their Peril; or else the Apostles and Primitive Bishops must be Condemned; and if so, it is much more Lawful, when for adhering to right they are deprived only by a pretended Power. But I suppose this *Virtuoso* will say, That *Jehojada* had been bound to leave of all care of discharging his Duty of High Priest, if *Athaliah* had Deprived him. As to his Second Question, (*Where was the Ecclesiastical Crime* Abiathar *was charged with?*) I answer, That though I spake of Ecclesiastical Censures, yet I did never limit the matter to pure Ecclesiastical Crimes, nor have I (that I can remember) so much as used that Phrase; for the Church may censure whatsoever is *Contra bonos mores*, though, at the same time, the Secular Power punish it as an Offence against the State: The one is Spiritual, and tends to their Repentance and Amendment, and consequently is for their Good: The other respects their Deserts, and the ill effects it had on the State, and repays and punisheth their Misdeeds. But if he would know *Abiathar*'s Crime, it was *High Treason*, which is a thing of so scandalous and dangerous a Nature, that he becomes unfit to discharge so sacred an Office, who is guilty of it; nor can the Censures of the Church be too severe against such Wickedness; when the Sons of Peace, and those which should teach and pay the strictest Obedience,

though they meet even with the greateſt Diſcouragements, ſhall turn Maſters of Miſrule, the Church ought to ſpew them out. As for *Abiathar*, he had forfeited his Life by his Treaſonable Actions, (I do not ſay by joyning with the Son againſt the Father) and in ſuch a caſe he who only reſtrained his Actions, but granted him both Life and an honourable Subſiſtance, was very kind. But whether this come neareſt to our Caſe or theirs, I leave ſucceeding Time, and more impartial Poſterity to judge.

He farther anſwers with the ſame learned Author to this effect, *That a Law was made, That all Magiſtrates, whether Sacerdotal or Civil, ſhould take an Oath that the Queen, (i. e.* Elizabeth) *was Supream.* &c. *under the Pain of Depoſition: For refuſing this, the Popiſh Biſhops were deprived, as preſumed to be for the Pope's Supremacy.* But then he adds, *The ſame Parity of Reaſon may hold for adminiſtring and taking the Oath of Allegiance to,* &c. *i. e.* Becauſe Biſhops might be deprived for refuſing an Oath to a lawful Power, againſt an unlawful; therefore they may be deprived for refuſing to take an Oath to an unlawful Power, againſt that which is lawful and rightful. And this he calls Parity of Reaſon, though an indifferent Perſon would ſay it were directly contrary to it; and that the Legality and Rightfulneſs of Power, being the Reaſon of the Oath to one, was a juſt Reaſon of denying it the other.

The ſame Author, he ſays, tells us, That when *thoſe Biſhops* would not take the Oath, *Epiſcopatibus ſuis tandem aliquando juxta Legem Parliamentariam ſunt abdicati.* And now he thinks he hath undone me: For he tells me *he leaves me this to Engliſh.* If I cannot, I will come to him for help; though I think I ſhall be very ill employed, if I do. But after all, I believe this Sentence was particularly pitched upon for the ſake of ſome Words in it. And firſt, he had an Eye to the Word *abdicati*, as a fine clinch on the Times, and grateful to his new Maſters. What a lucky hit was this, to find ſuch a Word in a venerable Clergy-man? Well! let them make their beſt on't: It is not to be doubted, but they will never ſtick at Abdicating Biſhops, who make no Scruple of Abdicating Kings. His next Reſpect was to the *Legem Parliamentariam*, which ſeemed to be a prety Offering to his Goddeſs *Diana*, the *Houſe of Commons*; for which they can do no leſs than nominate him to Preach before them the next Seſſions, and then he will forfeit his Conſcience, rather than miſs *the Thanks of the Houſe.* And yet I muſt tell him, That it is an Impropriety of Speech in his Author: For though the Parliament contrive, compoſe, and propound, yet they are the King's Laws, whoſe *Fiat* it is which makes them ſo. But the ſubtilleſt Fetch of all is in the Word *Epiſcopatibus*; which may ſignifie their Temporalities, and the Exerciſe of Epiſcopal Juriſdiction in their proper Dioceſſes, as it doth in this place; or elſe may ſignifie the Function and Order it ſelf. Now, he durſt not Engliſh it in this latter Senſe, for fear of giving up the whole Order, and being charged with down right *Eraſtianiſm*: And yet he was willing to leave it with an *Inuendo*, as if it ought to be taken in that ſenſe, that ſo he might gratifie the Secular Power with a boundleſs Authority: For thence are his Hopes; and ſome Men care not to betray their whole Order, ſo they can enrich themſelves. Thus, Sir, I have Engliſhed your Latin by Piecemeal, and, to requite your Favour, I leave it to you to put together again.

His Third Queſtion is this, *Whether if a Perſon be lawfully Deprived of the Exerciſe of his Miniſtry, he is notwithſtanding bound, as a private Member, to communicate in that Church? &c.* This he ſays, I deny, which is a falſe and impudent Slander; for nothing can be more plain, than that he, who is lawfully Deprived ought to acquieſce; the only

Remedy

Remedy left him in that caſe, is by all lawful means to get it off again as ſoon as he can. But he knows we deny the lawfulneſs of the Deprivation, upon which account we think it lawful for us to continue the Exerciſe of our Miniſtry, and would do it in conjunction with them, were it not that they both unjuſtly approve our pretended Deprivation, and refuſe to ſuffer us the Exerciſe of our Miniſtry, either in our own or their Churches, and alſo further clog their Communion with ſuch Terms, as is not lawful for us to comply with; and upon this ſcore we think we both may, and ought to maintain *a ſeparate Communion.* You ſhould have proved the Deprivation lawful, which you knew we denied; but inſtead of that, you all a long run away begging the Queſtion.

This ſhould have been the Laſt, but being a fruitful She Queſtion, it hath foaled Two more, and how many it may bring forth in time, Who knows? Like Twins he has put them together, and ſo let them go. *Whether Ordination oblige ſuch a one to the actual Exerciſe of his Office, when forbid by the Magiſtrate?* *And then, Whether for the Exerciſe of his Miniſtry, he may and is obliged to ſet up and maintain a ſeparate Communion?* And that I may comply with his way as far as I can, I will anſwer them with two more. Firſt, Whether the Apoſtles, having received their Commiſſion and Authority from Chriſt, were obliged to leave off the actual Exerciſe of their Office, when forbid by the Magiſtrate? Secondly, Whether if a Separation be made, thoſe who depart from others, or thoſe who give juſt Cauſe for it are the Schiſmaticks? But theſe I muſt leave to him, that we may examine how he ſolves his own. *If* (faith he) *the Magiſtrate may lawfully Deprive, then the Clerk may be lawfully Deprived, and if ſo, he is bound to ſubmit.* Still this is begging the Queſtion; for we complain not of what is lawfully, but what is unlawfully done. But he gives a Reaſon, which either proves too much, or manifeſtly ſhews, That he thinks either that the Magiſtrates Deprivation is always lawful, or though it ſhould be unlawful, yet muſt be ſubmitted to. *For* (faith he *p.* 13, 14.) *to officiate notwithſtanding ſuch a Prohibition, is in our way to take up Arms againſt him; and in a lower, to do what the Pope doth in a higher Station, and to controul his Juriſdiction.* Now this is a Knaviſh malicious Trick, to compare our Actions to the Popes; the Pope directly challengeth a Supremacy over Kings, indeed over all Men; we only lay claim to a Chriſtian Liberty, not to comply with Sin and Wickedneſs, though the Magiſtrate command it; and a Power not to deſert our Station, wherein Chriſt hath fixed us, for every humourſom or unjuſt Prohibition of the State, but at our Peril, and without Reſiſtance; and what Agreement hath this with the Popes Actions? But if his Civil Magiſtrate may not any ways be controuled, but muſt be complied with in all things, then I leave any indifferent Perſons to judge, whether theſe two things be not the direct Conſequences of his Arguments. Firſt, This makes the Proceedings of the Apoſtles, and all the Primitive Chriſtians, in propagating the Goſpel for about Three hundered Years, to be altogether unjuſtifyable. For they were actually prohibited firſt by the Jews, after by the Emperours; ſo that if his Doctrine had taken place, Chriſtianity had never entered into the World. Secondly, This ſhuts out the Doctrine of the Croſs, not only as Fooliſhneſs, but as Wickedneſs and Diſobedience, and puts it in the Power of the Civil Magiſtrate at his Pleaſure to extirpate Chriſtianity out of the World; for if prohibited, they muſt ceaſe and comply; becauſe to do otherwiſe *Were in their way to take up Arms againſt him, and controul his Juriſdiction.* And thus, if the Grand

Signior ſhould Silence all the *Chriſtian Miniſters* in his Dominions, they muſt hold their Peace, and no more ſpeak in the Name of Jeſus; for if they do our Author will tell them, they are Rebels. I perceive this Author makes uſe of his Religion only for his Convenience, and will put no more on than he can at any time put off again; he is here a ſort of a *Chriſtian*, and at *Japan* would be a *Hollander*.

But to make good his Argument, he accuſeth me of Ignorance as to the Primitive Times, and inſtanceth in *Euſtathius* of *Antioch*, *Athanaſius* of *Alexandria*, and *Paulus* of *Conſtantinople*, put out by the Imperial Power; and this he ſays, *Was never queſtioned by the Orthodox, though they complained of the Injuſtice of it*, &c. Now I confeſs, that I have not had thoſe Advantages which ſome have been happy in; and am content to be accounted Ignorant, provided he will ſuffer me to be Honeſt: But, yet as Ignorant as I am, I think, no Man that had conſulted his Cauſe, or his own Reputation would have produced this inſtance in this caſe. For it will either juſtifie our Proceedings, or force him to condemn theſe Perſons; and in ſo good Company we ſhall the leſs value hard Cenſures: For were they thruſt out of their Dioceſſes? What great difference is here? Are not our Livelihoods and Cures taken from us? Are not our Biſhops Deprived of their Profits and the exerciſe of their Juriſdictions? This we ſuffer, and do not ſo much as compare the Power then and now, whether lawful or unlawful: If the Civil Authority wrongfully ſpoil us of our Goods, and reſtrain our Perſons, we know no Reſiſtance any more then thoſe good Men did. But did they forbear to exerciſe their Office and Miniſtry where they had opportunity? No ſuch thing. Was there no Schiſm upon this account? It is plain, That the Orthodox refuſed to Communicate with the Biſhops put over them; the whole Chriſtian World was concerned on one ſide or other in the Caſe of *Athanaſius*; at *Conſtantinople* the People were ſo troubleſome, that the Emperor was forced to recal *Paulus*, though he was after again Baniſhed; and upon the Expulſion of *Euſtathius* from *Antioch*, the ſuſpected Biſhops, ſet over them, were diſguſted by many, and *Theodoret* ſays, That *plurimi Studioſi pietatis, cùm Sacerdotes tùm Plebs, deſertis Eccleſiaſticis cætibus, privatim Conveniebant* (lib. 1. cap. 21.) And this they continued to do, though all the Churches were taken away from the Adherents to *Euſtathius*, in order to force them to Communion with thoſe put in his place, as may appear from that requeſt of *Athanaſius* to the Emperor, for one Church to be granted to the Orthodox at *Antioch*, when he deſired the like of *Athanaſius* for the Arrians at *Alexandria* (*Theod. lib.* 2. *cap.* 12.) I think a Man ſo Skilful in Antiquity might have made choiſe of ſome more lucky inſtance; but that he may not be at too much trouble, if he can have a little Patience, it ſhall not be long ere I furniſh him.

Next in order to an Anſwer to his Second Queſtion, he ſuppoſeth the Clergy-man not bound by the Deprivation; but then (ſaith he) *What is this to a Separation? For is he ſo obliged, that rather then not officiate, he may and ought to break off from Communion with the Church?* If you will make that ſuppoſal (which in our particular Caſe is a great Truth) you of all Men were moſt unfit to put theſe Queſtions. For when you joyn with thoſe, who make this unjuſt Deprivation, when you take our Churches, our Flocks, our Livelyhoods, and ſuffer us not to exerciſe our Miniſtry, where you have the Profit of it, unleſs we will do it to the diſſatisfaction of our Conſciences, Do you complain that we do not maintain Communion with you? If we were in fault in this Caſe, yet Modeſty (if any be

be left you) and the ill Uſage we have from your Party, might make you hold your Peace. I freely grant, *That we ought to continue in the Communion of the Church we are of as long as we can, and that Separation is like a Divorce, which is the laſt Extremity*, &c. But then I ſay, That we ſtill are of the ſame Church we were of; for the Schiſm goes along with the Cauſe; and there it is you, not we, are the Schiſmaticks; the Separation I grant to be Unhappy and Miſchievous, but let them look to that who made the Divorce by juſtifying unlawful Proceedings, and ſetting up ſinful Terms of Communion, as I have already proved; and therefore will ſay no more of it here. And this is ſufficient for an Anſwer to that Slander, as if we proceeded upon the ſame Grounds with the Diſſenters, which is manifeſtly falſe; only I am bold to tell him, That they have now put a Plea into the Mouth of the Diſſenters, which will juſtifie their Separation from them; and were it not, that they cannot juſtifie their Separation from us, your Perfidiouſneſs and other ill Acts had given up the Cauſe to them.

When he thought he had loſt my Second Argument with multitudes of Queſtions, he attacks that which he calls the Third. And, he ſays, *I argue from the Subjection the People and Clergy owe to the Biſhops, and the Biſhops owe to their Metropolitan*; and I grant, That I do ſo, and the Argument muſt be good, unleſs he can Diſpute away all the Government and Orders of the Chriſtian Church. But to this he returns with all imaginable Scorn. *Our Author that undertakes to give us an account of the Senſe, Judgment, and Practice of the Primitive Times, would have done well to have given us a touch or two of his Skill that way, by ſome credeble Authorities; and particularly of ſuch a Subjection of the Biſhop to the Metropolitan, to the Confutation of ſome of St.* Cyprian's *Epiſtles.* It being very likely, that in a ſmall time the whole Controverſie may turn upon this hinge, and it being moſt becoming Church Men to direct Eccleſiaſtical Proceedings by Eccleſiaſtical Authority, I ſhall take a little more pains in this place to anſwer, not only what he now objects, but to take in what he hath at any time diſperſedly ſpoken as to this Matter. If this ſcornful Gentleman will ſo give up all to the Civil Power, that their Commands, and Orders muſt be actually obeyed and complyed with in every thing, he in effect grants two things (which done by any Clergy-man, to have his Gown pulled over his Ears were too mean a Puniſhment.) Firſt, That it is in their Power to deſtroy Chriſtianity, and in the room of it to plant any other, or none at all. Secondly, That Religion is only an Artifice or Sham to be made uſe of, ſo far as it is ſerviceable to the Civil Power, and no otherwiſe. By this you may perceive, what a Friend the Eraſtian is to the Atheiſt; and though our Author doth not ſpeak out, yet he hath many Expreſſions that look earneſtly that way. But he will allow, That the bleſſed Jeſus, who inſtituted the Chriſtian Church, did by a publiſhed Goſpel and Succeſſion of authorized Paſtors provide for the Directing, Ordering, and Governing of that Church, which they are to ſtand by in all Ages and Difficulties; then he muſt grant, That there are ſome Duties of a Chriſtian, which nō Civil Power can ſupercede; and though we are not allowed to reſiſt the lawful Civil Power, how hardly ſo ever it uſe us, yet we muſt practice our Duty at our peril; and if the Civil Power would obſtruct it, we muſt then take up our Croſs and follow Chriſt. And if this be not our Caſe, we are miſtaken Sufferers; but if it be, it will very much call in queſtion their Sincerity.

To fear God, and honour the King, and not meddle with thoſe, who are given to change, I think, was not only

only laid down as a wiſe Man's Advice, but deſigned as a Duty and Obligation upon every particular Perſon. But not to urge here matters of Juſtice, Fidelity, and common Honeſty, (which yet by the way, I think, are never to be ſlighted) we are here to conſider what Obligations we may lie under with reſpect to the Government, and Orders in the Church. And if he will allow me to reaſon either from the Practice of the Church, or the Canons of the Church, or the Writings of thoſe who beſt underſtood both, particularly St. *Cyprians*, whom he himſelf Magnifies, and than whom no Man better underſtood this Cauſe; then I doubt not but we may go a conſiderable way in it.

That Epiſcopacy is the higheſt Order in the *Chriſtian Church*, and that there is nothing, which one Biſhop as a Biſhop may do, but another may do the ſame, I readily grant; and conſequently, That there can be no ſuch thing as *Epiſcopus Epiſcoporum*: But then that there are withal certain Rights, Priviledges, and Prerogatives belonging to the Metropolitan, which have been always thought to have been inſeperably annexed to him, and from the exerciſe of which other Biſhops have been ever ordinarily debarr'd; and that upon this account, that the Peace and Unity of the Church cannot be otherwiſe preſerved, nor the Government managed; this (I ſay) I think to be as plain as the High way.

Whatever the Rights or Priviledges of Metropolitans may be, I ſhall only Diſcourſe of ſome, which were univerſally allowed by the Ancient *Church*, and confirmed by Canons, or Practice univerſally received, and which may at leaſt, in ſome meaſure, affect our Caſe; of which one is this, That no one was to be Ordained a Biſhop without the concurrence or conſent of the Metropolitan. *In the 19th. Canon of the 1ſt. Councel of* Antioch, it is thus determined, Ἐπίσκοπον μὴ χειροτονεῖσθαι δίχα συνόδου καὶ παρουσίας τοῦ ἐν τῇ μητροπόλει τὸ ἐπισκοπεῖν. *That a Biſhop ſhall not be Ordained without a Synod and the Preſence of the Metropolitan.* And when in the ſame Canon they had made the actual Preſence of the Metropolitan, as neceſſary as ſuch a caſe could permit, they add, εἰ δὲ ἄλλως τι παρὰ τὰ ὡρισμένα γίνοιτο, μηδὲν ἰσχύειν τὴν χειροτονίαν. *That if any thing be done otherwiſe, then as was than determined, the Ordination ſhall be invalid.* Now this very Canon was only purſuant to a Canon of the Councel of *Nice*; and becauſe moſt Men, eſpecially thoſe with whom we have now to do, have, at leaſt formerly, pretended a great Veneration for that Ancient Councel, we will ſee what was their Judgment, which in the 6th. Can. you may find expreſſed thus.— Καθόλου δὲ πρόδηλον ἐκεῖνο, ὅτι εἴ τις χωρὶς γνώμης τοῦ μητροπολίτου γένοιτο Ἐπίσκοπος· ὁ τοιοῦτον ἡ μεγάλη σύνοδος ὥρισεν μὴ δεῖν εἶναι ἐπίσκοπον. *Let this be univerſally known, that if any one be Ordained a Biſhop without the conſent of the Metropolitan, This great Counſel doth determine, that ſuch a one ought to be no Biſhop.* Perhaps it was for this Reaſon, That *Euſebius* (as far as I remember) in reckoning up the Eccleſiaſtical Succeſſion, except *Jeruſalem* (for which there might be particular Reaſons) mentions only Metropolitical Sees. For whilſt the Rights of the Metropolitan were preſerved, and his Succeſſion undoubted, it was ſcarce poſſible, that the other Biſhops of the Province ſhould come in any other way, but at the right Door; for he was either to be actually at, or conſent their to Ordination by Biſhops ſummoned by him for that purpoſe; ſo that as the being ſure concerning him, removed away all doubt of the reſt; ſo the being uncertain concerning him, of courſe makes all the Ordinations in his time uncertain. This I ſay, that you may conſider what will be the effect of Setting up a Metropolitan againſt a Metropolitan, and how it is a fair way to render the validity

of

of the Ministerial Function called in question. But of what force such an Act would be, if done, I shall consider presently.

Another matter appropriated by the universal Church to the Metropolitan, was, that nothing of Moment, which might concern the Province, or be of general Concernment, should be done without his privity and consent; so that unjustly to set a Metropolitan aside, and for other Bishops to neglect him, is to make matters of greatest Moment, and nearest Concernment to the Church to become impracticable; and to draw a Scandal upon the Actions of all Bishops, as to any thing they shall do in such Cases; and when I have offered Authorities for the Proof of this, I leave others to judge whether they are *Credible* enough for such a Huff as our Author. Amongst those Ancient Canons, collected and received before the Councel of *Nice*, which are vulgarly called the Apostles Canons, the 34th. runs thus, τοὺς Ἐπισκόπους ἑκάστου ἔθνους εἰδέναι χρὴ τὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς πρῶτον, καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι αὐτὸν ὡς κεφαλὴν, καὶ μηδέν τι πράττειν περίττον ἄνευ τῆς ἐκείνου γνώμης ἐκεῖνα δὲ μόνα πράττειν ἕκαστον, ὅσα τῇ αὐτοῦ παροικία ἐπιβάλλει καὶ ταῖς ὑπ' αὐτὴν χώραις. ἀλλὰ μηδὲ ἐκεῖνος ἄνευ τῆς πάντων γνώμης ποιείτω τι. οὕτω γὰρ ὁμονοία ἔσται, καὶ δοξαθήσεται ὁ θεὸς διὰ κυρίου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, καὶ ὁ πατὴρ διὰ κυρίου ἐν ἁγίῳ πνεύματι. Ὁ πατὴρ καὶ ὁ υἱὸς καὶ τὸ πνεύματο ἅγιον. i. e. *The Bishops of every Country ought to observe him, who is their First (or Chief) and to esteem him as their Head, and to do nothing of Moment without his Consent. Every other Bishop to employ himself only about those things, which are business of his proper Diocess and the Villages (or Places) thereunto belonging. Neither let him (i. e. the Chief) do any thing without the Concurrence of the rest. And so Unity shall be preserved, and God shall be gloryfied,* &c. To this very Canon the Conncil of *Nice* relates, and explains what is meant by the τὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς πρῶτον, *the first amongst them.* For after a great deal of care taken about the Ordination of the Metropolitan, as a Matter of great moment for the Churches Security, they conclude the Canon thus, τὸ δὲ κύρος τῶν γινομένων δίδοσθαι καθ' ἑκάστην ἐπαρχίαν τῷ μετροπολίτῃ, (*Can.* 4.) i. e. *Let the Authority* (or Confirmation) of things done *throughout every Province belong to the Metropolitan.* Upon this very Canon did the *African* Fathers found their Authority for that saying in their Epistle to *Cœlestine*, Bishop of *Rome*, *Decreta Nicæna, sive inferioris gradûs Clericus, sive ipsos Episcopos, suis Metropolitanis apertissime commiserunt.* i. e. *The Decrees of the Council of* Nice *have most plainly put, not only the Clergy of inferiour Rank, but even the Bishops themselves, under the Jurisdiction of their Metropolitans.* And to both the foregoing Canons the Council of *Antioch* seems plainly to referr, in their 9th *Can.* τοὺς καθ' ἑκάστην ἐπαρχίαν ἐπισκόπους εἰδέναι χρὴ τὸν ἐν τῇ μητροπόλει προεστῶτα ἐπισκόπον καὶ τὴν φροντίδα ἀναδέχεσθαι πάσης τῆς ἐπαρχίας, &c. i. e. *It behoves the Bishops in every Province, to know the Bishop of the Metropolitical See, and that he undertakes the Care and Management of the whole Province; and that by reason of the great Concourse of People from all places to the Metropolis, upon account of Business,* &c. And having thus confirmed the Jurisdiction of Metropolitans, they tell you, That they did it, κατὰ τὸν ἀρχαῖον κρατήσαντα τῶν πατέρων ἡμῶν κάνονα. i. e. *According to an ancient Canon of our Fathers, binding,* (or in force.) And that you may know what particular Canon in this they had an eye to, in the very next Words, speaking of the Duty of Bishops, they expressed it thus, ταῦτα μόνα ὅσα τῇ ἑκάστου ἐπιβάλλει παροικία καὶ ταῖς ὑπ' αὐτὴν, χώραις; which are the very words used in the Apostles Canon for the same purpose, as any one may see, who will compare them together. From all this it is evident, That even Bishops themselves

themselves cannot regularly transact any thing, in Reference to their Churches in common, without their Metropolitan. And if a Metropolitan be set up against a lawful Metropolitan, the latter by the Laws of the Church being made null, and consequently he no Metropolitan, all their Actions in conjunction with him will be uncanonical and scandalous, and extreamly to the trouble, confusion, and detriment of the Church: And how this agrees with the Publick Good he prates of afterwards, let any Christian judge.

To prevent being tedious, I shall mention only one more Right or Prerogative, belonging to the Metropolitan; and that is, either at the stated Times, or upon extraordinary Occasions, and the common concern of the Church, to call together or summon the other Bishops of the Province, to appear in Council, and there to debate and confirm Matters with them. The Council of *Antioch*, in their 20th Canon, appointing two Synods in the Year, for the determining Controversies, and other Ecclesiastical Uses, in the same Canon tell us, ἐπιτελεῖσθαι τὴν συνόδον, ὑπομιμνήσκοντες τοὺς ἐπαρχιῶτας τοῦ ἐν τῇ μητροπόλει, i. e. *That is truly a Synod, when those of the Province are warned by the Bishop of the Metropolis:* And that a Synod is not lawfully congregated otherwise, they plainly thus tell us, in the same Canon, μὴ ἐξεῖναι δὲ τίνας καθ' ἑαυτοὺς συνόδους ποιεῖσθαι ἄνευ τῶν πεπιστευμένων τὰς μητροπόλεις; i. e. *It is not lawful for any to make Synods of themselves, without those to whom the Metropoles are intrusted.* But when they are so called, it seems that, for their Proceeding Synodically, his Presence, if it can be had, is extreamly necessary. For so much that in the 16th Canon of the same Council seems to import, τελείαν δὲ ἐκείνην εἶναι συνόδον, ἧς συμπαρέστι καὶ ὁ τῆς μητροπόλεως, i. e. *That is a compleat Synod, wherein the Metropolitan is present with the rest.* But this is a Matter so known and acknowledged, that I need not labour to confirm it: But that which I use it for is this, That as Matters are now managed, and much more as suddenly to be expected, things will be brought to that pass, that we can have no Convocation; or if we should have, yet all their Acts would be invalid; I mean, as to any Ecclesiastical or Canonical Authority; for if that may be set aside, so may the Persons too, and the business done by other hands; and so farewell all Convocations for ever. Such glorious Advantages some blessed Revolutions may bring to pass.

Against this he objects the Authority of St. *Cyprian*, in *some of his Epistles*; but which those Epistles are, he doth not tell us; nor doth he afford us so much as one Word out of them. But I believe the Reason was, That he could find none to serve his Turn: For none of the Fathers better understood the Discipline and Government of the Church, than St. *Cyprian*; And that I have no Cause to confute all his Epistles, he shall presently understand. But sure he was either in great Haste, or in great Scarcity of Authorities, who mentions only St. *Cyprian* in this Case, who was himself a Metropolitan, and of how great Authority, may appear from the Case of *Rogatianus*, a Bishop of his Province, who would not so much as punish his refractory Deacon, (though a thing which properly belonged to his own Cognizance,) without first consulting St. *Cyprian*. Some daring Persons perhaps may look upon this as the weak Act of a timerous old Man; but if it be well examined, this very Act will prove *Rogatianus* to have been a Man of great Judgment, Prudence, and Foresight. For though it was in his Power to censure his Deacon, yet it was also in his Deacon's Power to appeal; and little less could be expected from so stubborn a Fellow as he is represented: And had he done so, the Case had been altered; *Rogatianus*, from a Judge, must have become a Party, and though his Cause had

had been never so just, yet it had prolonged time, and put him to a great deal of Expence and Trouble: But by proceeding according to the Advice of his Metropolitan, he did wisely forestall and prevent an Appeal; and thus did his business with Speed, and with as little pains and charge as might be. As for St. *Cyprian*, as his Age scarce afforded a Person of greater Authority; so, as to the Extent of his Jurisdiction, perhaps there was not a greater Metropolitan at that time in the Christian World. He himself saith of it, *Latius fusa est Provincia nostra; habet enim Numidiam, & Mauritanias duas sibi cohærentes, (ad Cornel. Ep. 45.)* And though in dread and abhorrence of the *Typhus Seculi*, the African Fathers were such Enemies to the Titles of *Eparch* or *Patriarch*, that they decreed against the Name, yet if there were Metropolitans in *Numidia* and *Mauritania*, in St. *Cyprian's* time, as it is certain there was not long after, then he had the Thing, though not the Name; and if I mistake not, the peculiar Title of the Bishop of *Carthage* was *Primate*. For when the Council was determining the Order and Precedence of Bishops, and *Zantippus*, the Metrolitan of *Numidia*, asks what could be said against the present Determination, all the Bishops give their Consent, but with this Exception, σωζομένε ἔτι μὴν τῆ δικαία τῶν πρωτευόντων τῆ Νουμιδίας καὶ Μαυρεσίανίας. i. e. *The Rights of the Primate of* Numidia *and* Mauritania *being preserved.* And that this was not intended as a Compliment, but a Reality, is apparent in the very next Decree, where though in favour of *Numidia* it is granted, That a Register shall be kept at *Constantina*, the Metropolis of that Country; yet in token of their Subjection to the Primate, it is ordered also, That the same shall be at *Carthage*; for that, if any thing, must be the meaning of πρώτη Καθέδρα in that place, (*Cod. Can. Ec. Afr. num.* 96.) But if these things reach not St. *Cyprian*, yet it is plain enough that he was a Metropolitan of very great Authority, and so as our Author makes use of his Name, it is plainly to cite him against himself.

From the Case of Metropolitans I shall come to that of Bishops in general. I make no doubt, but that a lawful Secular Power may as well punish a Clergyman as a Layman, for any Crime committed against the State, proportionably to his Fault: But still I say, the Secular Power can neither make nor unmake a Clergyman. To make such, plainly requires an Authority from *Christ*; and if the Civil Power can unmake such, then he can vacate the Authority of *Christ*, and destroy all the Power he left in his Church. Deprivation I take to be no very proper Term, applied to the Secular Power with respect to the Clergy: But how far a lawful Secular Power may restrain a Bishop from the Exercise of his Episcopal Authority, I will not discourse; nor do I take it to be our Case. But this I say, That if the Secular Power, though never so undoubtedly lawful, shall so restrain a Bishop from the Exercise of his Episcopal Function and Authority, that in effect there shall be no Bishop of the place, or another is put in his room; then, beside the Justice of the Cause, it is requisite that the Church's Censure accompany such Fact; that so a due Ecclesiastical Provision may be made in such case, without which Christians cannot be satisfied as to Communion: But then if a lawful Secular Power, much more an unlawful Power, shall unjustly deprive a Bishop, whatever either he or his Flock may be bound quietly to suffer; yet the Flock cannot by such Act be bound to abandon and renounce their lawful Canonical Pastor, but may and ought to Communicate with him as well as they can. All the Orthodox Christian World did look upon *Athanasius* as Bishop of *Alexandria*, when he was banished into *Gallia*; and when upon the Banishment of him *Liberius Felix* was substituted in his

place at *Rome*, it made a Schiſm, and it had been a very Pernicious one, had not *Felix* opportunely died. I will not urge upon our Author, That his frequent looſe way of expreſſing himſelf doth, in effect, baſely give up, not only the Epiſcopal Order, but all the Orders in Chriſt's Church, and conſequently the Church it ſelf, to the Secular Power, be it what it will; if this was done deſignedly, (as it ſeems to be) it is ſo much the worſe: But I will keep my ſelf to regular Eccleſiaſtical Practices and Authorities; and if a Clergy-man will not abide by theſe, or return them a fair Anſwer, he is much more fit for a Cenſure than a Diſputation.

It is a Rule ſo well known to be univerſally received by the Ancient Church, *That there ſhall be but one Biſhop in a City*, that I need not ſpend time to prove it. That of the *Chorepiſcopi* doth not alter the caſe, and particularly is nothing to our caſe, for theſe two Reaſons. Firſt, That though they were a ſort of Rural Biſhops, yet they were only as Aſſiſtants, and acted in Subordination to, and by the Direction of the City Biſhop. Secondly, That we have none ſuch now; and as for thoſe, who are ſo haſty to get into the places of our pretendly deprived Biſhops, they would never own themſelves to be *Chorepiſcopi*, but challenge the whole entire Juriſdiction, and abſolutely thruſt out the lawful Canonical Biſhops, contrary to all the Rules of the Church. The reaſon why this Rule hath been held ſo Sacred, is partly, becauſe to do otherwiſe would be to make the Church a Monſter; for in St. *Cyprian's* Senſe a Church is a People united to their Biſhop; where by the way obſerve, That the Word *Plebs*, or People, is taken in a larger Senſe, as well for the Clergy as Layety under the Juriſdiction of one Biſhop: And here the Biſhop ſupplying the place of the Head, and the People of the Body; to ſet up two Biſhops were to make two Heads; partly becauſe if two Powers, independent upon each other, command and direct in the ſame Church, it would breed ſuch Diſorders and Confuſions as uſually end in Schiſm; and indeed it might make the Obedience of the People impoſſible, whilſt they might command different things at the ſame time; and for this reaſon both ſo great Power was given to Metropolitans in Provincial Churches, and all Biſhops were Prohibited any Acts of Juriſdiction out of their own Precincts, which might be any ways prejudicial to the Canonical Biſhop of the Place. And therefore where there is a lawful Biſhop, another ought not to be placed there; if it be otherwiſe, the whole Act is void; and this, Sir, your good Friend St. *Cyprian* will tell you, *Epiſcopo ſemel Facto, & Collegarum ac Plebis teſtimonio & judicio comprobato, alium conſtitui nullo modo poſſe.* (Ep. 41. ad Cornel.) This, I think, is plain enough; but becauſe our Author is for abundance of Words, if he pleaſe to read St. *Cyprian's* Epiſtle to *Antoſvianus*, who favoured *Novatianus* in ſuch a caſe as is daily expected will be ours, he may there find Reaſons, as well as bare Aſſertions, of which take this taſte; *Cum nemo ante ſe* (he ſpeaks of *Cornelius* Biſhop of *Rome*) *factus eſſet, cùm Fabiani locus*, i. e. *cum locus Petri & gradus Cathedræ Sacerdotalis vacaret, quo occupato de dei voluntate, atque omnium noſtrùm conſeaſione firmato; quiſquis jam Epiſcopus fieri voluit, foris fiat neceſſe eſt, nec habeat Eccleſiaſticam Ordinationem, qui Eccleſiæ non tenet Unitatem; quiſquis ille fuerit, multum de ſe jactans, & ſibi plurimum vindicans, profanus eſt, alienus eſt, foris eſt. Et cùm poſt primum ſecundus eſſe non poſſit, quiſquis poſt unum, qui ſolus eſſe debeat, factus eſt, non jam ſecundus ille, ſed nullus eſt.* (Ep. 52.) Thus it is plain, That the grand Reaſon why St. *Cyprian* gives the Cauſe againſt *Novatian*, was, becauſe *Cornelius* in the Vacancy of the See was Canonically placed there before him. If therefore a Biſhop be thruſt into the

the place of another, who is lawfully Biſhop of the Place, all ſuch tranſactions are void and null in themſelves; and all that forſake their true Biſhop, and joyn with him who is thruſt in, are Schiſmaticks; and though there ſhould be any Penalty or Deprivation befall the Biſhop; yet if it be ſuch, which in its own Nature doth only amount to a Suſpenſion, it cannot make the Place capable of another Biſhop; becauſe, notwithſtanding the preſent reſtraint, he remains Biſhop ſtill, though under a kind of an arreſt; and in ſuch Caſe the return of the uſe and exerciſe of that Authority, which all this while is really lodg'd in him, is to be waited and endeavoured.

From hence, I think, it doth appear, that it was a ruled Caſe in the Church, That if any Perſon did come into any other than a vacant See, and claim there as direct and proper Biſhop, (as *Novatianus* did againſt *Cornelius*,) both he and all his adherents were adjudged Schiſmaticks. As to a Vacancy I am ſtill of the ſame Mind, and if our Author would have me change it, he would ſooner have prevailed with me by Arguments than Threatnings; I have ſeriouſly thought on it, and cannot yet imagine how a Vacancy can be, but one of theſe three ways; either God muſt make the See void by his Death, or a lawful Authority makes it voyd by a lawful Depoſition, or he himſelf makes it void by his Renunciation. For the laſt of theſe, I perceive, our Author has a preſent kindneſs, but how long it may hold I know not. For when others have taken away their Eſtates, he in a pretty ſly way perſwades them to mend the Matter, by renouncing their Order, and, I believe, with much the ſame deſign, that the Fox praiſed the Cock for an excellent Singer, that while he ſhut his Eyes as he crow'd, Reynard might have the opportunity to run in upon him, and make a prey of him; as to the ſecond way, which is Depoſition, I do not ſee that there is the leaſt room for any Plea for it in this Caſe. For be the Authority of the Secular Power what it will, as to the taking away their Eſtates, the confinement or puniſhment of their Perſons, or the temporary reſtraint of the exerciſe of their Authority; yet, that the Secular Power can unmake a Biſhop, (which is the only thing can, as to them, come up to our Caſe,) I ſtill peremptorily deny: And let our Author clap his Hands and cry S'too, let him ſet all he can on my Back, all the threatnings in the World, nay all the things that can be threatned ſhall never fright me from it; indeed if he can fairly convince me by Argument, I will yield, and give up my Religion, when they pleaſe to demand it: But he had beſt have a care what he does; for, in the end, he himſelf would be no Gainer by the Bargain. In the next place, if he fly to an Eccleſiaſtical Depoſition, there ſeveral things muſt be enquired into. As, Firſt, A ſufficient Cauſe, without which the Act would be manifeſt Injuſtice, if not void. To enquire after all the Cauſes, for which a Biſhop may lawfully be Depoſed, would be too tedious; *Photius* in the 14th. Ch. of his *Nomocanon* refers us to very many, I will not ſay all; our Author may ſearch them at his leaſure, and ſee if he can pick up a new Charge; as for the preſent Accuſation it is a thing of that Nature, that the contrary may rather juſtifie the doing the ſame by others. In the next place there muſt be competent Judges; and the 12th. Canon of the Council of *Carthage* will not allow leſs than Twelve Biſhops to depoſe a Biſhop. But lay all Circumſtances together as our preſent Caſe is, and I am apt to think that there will not be found any competent Authority to ſit in Judgment upon our Biſhops. But be that as it will, When hath any ſuch Authority made any offer that way? Laſtly, There muſt be a full and fair Hearing. And in the cloſe of the 97th. Canon of the Council

of

of *Carthage* you may ſee what Horrour the Biſhops expreſſed in the Caſe of *Quodvultdeus* of Depoſing a Biſhop, before his Cauſe had a full and final Hearing. Indeed in ſome Caſes the Canons cenſure *ipſo facto*, and then ſuch ſolemn Proceedings are not neceſſary; but even then there muſt be a notoriety of the Fact the Canon relates to, and there muſt be a Declaration, that the Canon takes Place. But I do not ſee that any of theſe things can be ſo much as pretended in this Caſe, and therefore depoſed they are not: The laſt way of Vacancy is Death; but of that I need not Diſcourſe, there are (thanks be to God) if not a great, yet a venerable Number of them living; and, I hope, God will long continue their Lives for his Honour, their own Renown, and the Good of this diſtreſſed Church.

From the foregoing Diſcourſe, theſe Conſequences may be fairly drawn; Firſt, That whoſoever ſhall be put into the Place of the pretended Deprived Biſhops, are not to be eſteemed Biſhops, nor ought either Clergy or People to regard them, but to adhere firmly to their former true Biſhops. Secondly, That whoſoever ſhall Ordain ſuch, or endeavour to Place them there, make themſelves Criminals, and liable to an Eccleſiaſtical Cenſure. Thirdly, That they and all their adherents are Schiſmaticks. I am accuſtomed to ſpeak my Mind plainly; if this do not pleaſe you, I cannot help it; you were pleaſed to call for Authorities, I have given you ſome, and when you are at leaſure, I hope I ſhall hear of your Epiſtles.

Having thus diſpatched the Argument, I think, I need not put in any Anſwer to his impertinent Queſtions; but whereas he ſays, *My Argument will ſerve either way*, as well for the Biſhops and Metropolitans that have, as thoſe that have not taken the Oaths, he is much miſtaken; for if my Allegation be good, they will be liable to cenſure; and if he conſider, he will yield that that alters the Caſe. And by this he may perceive, That whatever matters of State have occaſioned, yet it is not bare matters of State we proceed upon, nor do we think it unlawful to ſwear Allegiance to the Sovereign Power; and therefore both his Queſtions in that reſpect are Impertinent. But I deſire to know what Primitive Chriſtians ever thought it lawful to take an Oath of Allegiance, to that which is no Sovereign, againſt that which really is, or to take a later Oath directly contrary to a former lawful Oath? But if he can find none ſuch, if he pleaſe, I can furniſh him with a ſort of Chriſtians in the Primitive Times, who made ſo little Conſcience of Oaths, that *Jura, Perjura; Sacretum prodere noſi*, is ſaid to be a received Axiome amongſt them; and if theſe are for his turn, I do not envy him their Company. But one great Artifice of our Author, is to take the out skirts, or ſome little ſnips of the Cauſe, and then put Queſtions as if we were concerned about nothing elſe, which is pitiful Sophiſtry; if he pleaſe to deal fairly, and take the whole Caſe together, he may take the liberty to ask as many Queſtions as he pleaſe, and I doubt not but he may be furniſhed with Anſwers. In the mean time I ſhall leave this matter here; and as for what follows, it coming not up ſo fairly to the Merits of the Cauſe, I ſhall be very ſhort.

The next thing that comes upon the Stage, is, *Publick Good*, which, like the *Phœnix*, is born to deſtroy it ſelf; for it is rarely uſed, but when all other Reaſons fail; and commonly then moſt ſtrongly pretended, when the Intention and Deſign is to deſtroy it. Much Fairer and Honeſter it would be, if Men would plead the Juſtice and Righteouſneſs of their Cauſe, and not thus juſtifie the moſt ſhameleſs Treachery and prodigious Villany under the Diſguiſes and falſe Pretences of Publick Good; but I muſt follow our Author, and it ſhall be as cloſe as I can, that I may the ſooner

have

have done with him, and get into better Company. I did say, that the task his Author undertook would better become a *Committee-man or Sequestrator than a Divine of the Church of* England; and he grants that this had been true, provided it had been true that he undertook what I charge him with, *That the Publick Good will Warrant us to destroy a lawful King*. As to which I shall only ask this Question, Whether K. *J.* was our lawful K. or not? If he was, I think they have destroyed him as far as they can; that it is not done more effectually, is not for want of good Will, but of Power: And if I be not strangely mistaken, this is the thing which is defended, or which at least ought to be defended; for otherwise all the rest fails. Next he taxeth me, as having *either a bad Memory, or a very bad Conscience*, for saying, That his Author had not proved the matter in *Hypothesi*, &c. *in our particular Case*; now a bad Memory is no good thing, but a very bad Conscience is a very ill thing; but, I think, I have no great cause to accuse either in this Matter. For let them pretend what they will, particular Persons and Actions, and the thing as it really is, they will never be brought to; but here they always suppose Cases, which they would have People to belive is ours, or like ours, but never come home to the point. If they would give me leave, I would propound some Cases of Conscience, and name Persons and Actions; so that a direct Answer must unavoidably be given, or the trifling appear; but I would advise these Men not to talk too much of Conscience, least they should awaken her, and she should sing a Song in their Ears, and make their Hearts ake. But before he can come to the Matter, this learned Author in Romances, not being able to find out any thing more contemptible, compares me to Don *Quixot*; but he should have remembred, that he was a kind of a desperate Fellow, and there may be some hazard in undertaking such an Adversary; however, I believe, I shall never mistake him for an Enchanted Castle, or a Wind-mill, though, for any thing I know, he may have one in his Head.

Three Heads he propounds from my Discourse, of which the last is the Notion of Publick Good, and after his Landable Crabfashion, of going backward, he will needs begin with that; but at last I find we are agreed, That Publick Good is good for Somebody, but who that Somebody is, it seems we are not yet agreed; for, he says, it is not a *Personal Good*, and yet if it be not good for *Persons*, I am afraid it will prove good for no Body. If he had pleased, he might have observed, That I called the Publick Good a *Personal Good*, not with reference to Mens private separate Intereſt in detriment of the rest, but with respect to them as Persons in Society; and doubtless Publick Good is in its highest Exaltation, when it's Diffusive to all; but yet in some Cases particular Persons, or Parties may, and must suffer for the Preservation of the Community, and this I fairly owned, and if he would not see it, I cannot help it; but to argue as if I disowned any such thing, is very Disingenuous. But if there may be some Cases, wherein it may be the Glory of some to suffer; Yet will this prove it to be the Publick Good, for some Men to raise their Fortunes upon the Ruins of their Country? I think he might as well say, That a Man ought to set his House on fire on purpose, that three or four Thieves might have the opportunity to run away with the best of his Goods. I know not better how to compare the Publick Good of a Community, than to the safety of a human body, when every Part and Member is right, sound, and well disposed, and out of danger, it is certainly then best with it; but if a blow be made at me, I shall rather take it on my Arm than on my Head, though it was intended at my Head, and not at my Arm; and yet, I think, herein the Arm had no injustice from the Head or Body, though it had from the external Enemy, because the use of it in such case is to defend the Head, and it would have suffered more, if the blow had been taken there; and as to internal Distempers, some are removed by Cure, and every part preserved; but in case the whole be indangered by the disaffection of a part, then we come to Amputation, and spare not a Leg or Arm, or any Member, whereby the Body may be preserved sound, though not entire; but then this is a remedy which brings an irrecoverable loss, leaves a Maim for ever, and is never to be used but in

caſes of abſolute Neceſſity; but then if the Diſtemper affect the Head or Heart, as all lawful Means ought to be uſed, ſo all Hazards muſt be run: For nothing can Warrant the cutting off the Head, or pulling out the Heart. Here the whole unavoidably muſt follow the fate of the part, and ſo the Remedy is worſe than the Diſeaſe, and therefore under no pretence whatſoever to be practiſed. If it be objected, That the Head hath not the ſame Connexion with the Civil and with the Natural Body, and that the Civil Body may be preſerved by a new Head, though not the Natural; I Anſwer, Firſt, That it is the ſafeſt Courſe for the Preſervation of the Society to pay the ſame deference to the Civil Head as to the Natural; and this, I think, our Conſtitutions do, by making the legal Succeſſion of Kings to be the ſame Head, according to that known Axiome *Rex non moritur*. Secondly, That in any Body whatſoever it is moſt unnatural for the Body to conſpire againſt, and deſtroy the Head. Thirdly, That in this reſpect the Civil Head hath a cloſer Connexion with the Body, than the Natural; that the Ligaments between it and the Body are the Conſtitutions, ſo that let him be driven where he will, whilſt he is alive and in Being, he will bear the Relation of the Head to the Body, while thoſe Conſtitutions laſt. To alter theſe at pleaſure, and Mens Rights with them, is the higheſt Injuſtice; and the ſetting any other Head on than the Conſtitutions bear, moſt certainly puts the Body into ſtrange Convulſions, and often ere long brings Ruin upon it. Beware a Common-wealth, my Maſters! Methinks I hear the Magpyes, Daws, Crows and Rooks about the Town, begin to ſet their Notes that way.

But after all, let all, that can, be allowed to Publick Good; yet it ought to be conſidered whether it be the particular Caſe, and whether the Publick Good be Secured or Advanced. And here it would be enquired, Whether Religion be better Secured to us? Whether Mens Lives and Properties are more Safe? How we encreaſe in Strength, in Trade, in Riches, and the like? And though I do not admire our Gain, yet many of theſe Things are out of my way; but there is a certain Tract, called the *DEAR BARGAIN*, which ſpeaks of theſe Things; and if the Government would encourage that Author to write, I am perſwaded he would quickly ſet that Controverſie in the true Light; and to him as the fitteſt Man I leave it.

The next thing is the Practicability of this Principle of Publick Good. Now whatever the Publick Good is, or whatever it may Warrant, yet if People are to make that their Rule, they will judge of it, and then every one will judge of Publick Good according to his own Intereſt and Perſuaſion; and this by ſeveral Arguments I did prove would fill the World with Violence and Confuſion. But he is ſo far from anſwering any of my Arguments, that he never mentioneth one of 'em as ſenſible that it would ſpoil *all* that he intended to ſham on me afterwards. But very honeſtly he Sums up my Argument, as I neither laid nor meant it, and tells me, That the *Publick Good's being liable to be abuſed*, is an inconcluding Argument, not only becauſe of the Inconſequence, but becauſe *this is a way of Arguing, that may ſerve againſt any thing; and if we put Publick Juſtice, or Laws, or Religion, or Reformation, into the place of Publick Good, it will hold in any of them as well as the other:* Grant this to be true, though it is of his own making; yet will this conclude, that whoever pleads Publick Good, Religion, or Reformation, is neceſſarily in the Right? And if it be ſo liable to be abuſed, Doth it not nearly concern us to examine well whether it be not abuſed? When ſo many have been impoſed upon by it, and even we our ſelves ſo very lately almoſt to our utter Ruin, muſt we ſtill be ſuch Fools as to belive without more adoe every bawling, or ſelf-intereſſed Fellow, who cries *Publick Good*? For this Reaſon I did then fairly intimate, That *Publick Good* as a common Noiſe, or ſolitary Plea, is never to be admitted without ſuch *Criterions*, and other Evidences accompanying it, as may make it appear, that what is pleaded is real. And thus it will be in any of the Caſes he ſuppoſeth; if he pleaſe he may ſet up the cry of *Reformation*, and then the Church of *England* is for Reforming the Church of *Rome*; yea, at this time perhaps one part of it is for Reforming another; the Presbyterian would Reform them both, and the Independent

dent outdoeth him; and ſtill the Anabaptiſt hath a Knack of Reforming further, and the Quaker he is for Reforming them all. Now ſet all theſe on Work, and encourage them by telling them, That the Plea of Reformation being liable to be abuſed is no Argument, but it is Inconſequent, and would reach to Publick Good, or any thing elſe; and if they were ſuffered to go on in this mad Humour, I am apt to think, that in a ſhort time, they would reform away all Religion. And if therefore Reformation be required, we muſt not preſently fall to altering or pulling down, but firſt enquire whether there be any thing that ſtands in need of Reformation. For if things be either well or near well, change is rarely for the better: But if there be diſcovered either ſuch groſs Errors, or intolerable Abuſes as need Reformation, yet it muſt be done in a regular Courſe; for though there ſhould be never ſo much need of Reformation, if you will allow all to be Publick Reformers, you will mend Religion worſe than thoſe Tinkers do Kettles, who, inſtead of ſtopping one hole, make two. And thus as to Publick Good, the bare Name of it is not enough, eſpecially when ſuch great Actions are pretended for the ſake of it, as for any thing we know may prove fatal; and therefore when ſuch a Pretence is ſet up, I think, there is a double Teſt whereby it ought to be tryed; for as a Civil Society we ought to examine ſuch Pretences with their agreeableneſs to our Conſtitutions; for if they be contrary to them, they portend a Civil Deſtruction. But then as we are a Chriſtian Society, this Pretence of Publick Good muſt be examined by the Rules of Righteouſneſs, and the Goſpel of the Bleſſed Jeſus; and if Men will pretend for Publick Good, to diſannul indiſpenſable Duties, to deſtroy all Faith and Truth amongſt Men, and to over-throw the very Nature of Good and Evil, by making it Changeable and Subſervient to every preſent Turn and Occaſion; this is the ready way to deſtroy not only the Civil Society, but the Chriſtian Church. And if that which makes void Promiſes and Oaths, which evacuates God's Commandments, which transforms Treachery into Vertue, and either makes it lawful to do Evil that Good may come of it, or flatly ſays it is no Evil, if Good may happen to come of it, (for I think there is not much Good come of it yet.) I ſay if this be not Deſtructive of the Evangelical Rule, I know not what can. And if diſintereſſed Perſons were to judge of Particulars in the preſent Caſe, I dread to think on which Side even a Moral Heathen would give the Verdict, to the Shame of ſuch numbers of Chriſtians.

The third thing propoſed, is, *who ſhall be Judge?* i. e. either of the Miſchief, or the Remedy. As to the former, he ſays, *The Caſe before us is ſuppoſed to be notorious*: It is indeed ſuppoſed, but it was never proved. Muſt we deſtroy a King and Government for the Shams and Slanders that malicious Men ſuppoſe in defence of their Wickedneſs? Two things indeed he mentions, which have a Tendency (as he ſaith) to *the Deſtruction of a Government, Deſertion and Lunacy*. Now, if K. *J.* was Lunatick, this is the firſt time I have heard of it; but if he was, that is not a ſufficient ground to depoſe him: Indeed it may warrant the ſetting up a Protector, or Regent, to act in his Name; but the Honour and Title ſtill remain with him. This ſeems to be the Caſe of *Edward* III. who at the latter end of his Reign, being ſenſible of his Indiſpoſition for Government, made *Lionel*, Duke of *Clarence*, Regent of the Realm. But this bereaved neither *Edward* III. his Father, nor *Richard* II. his Nephew, of their Right. As for Deſertion, I think they ought not for ſhame to have named it, unleſs they had returned ſome better Anſwer to the Paper called *Deſertion Diſcuſs'd*, than impriſoning the Author. But he ſaith, I might as well have asked, *who ſhall be the Judge, whether the Banks are broken down in an Inundation*, &c. I hope he doth not mean an Inundation of Foreigners, Poverty, and Cruelty. But who is it hath broke the Banks, or made the Breaches? Or how are they repared and amended? No doubt, but that now all is well, and we are out of danger, and as ſafe as Thieves in a Mill. But after all, he might have conſidered, That there is a great difference between judging in Naturals and Politicks. As to the Objects of my Senſes, Nature hath made me the Judge, ſo that if I ſee the Water break in, or the Wall thrown down, I need not ask another, whether it be

ſo or no; but I am not ſo proper a Judge of the Tendency of my Superiours Actions, they being often moved by ſuch Springs as I cannot ſee, and therefore can make no certain Judgment of them: And it is no ſtrange thing for People to miſtake theſe Actions when done, and not to know what is good for themſelves. Thus the Earl of *Strafford* was accuſed for advancing Trade in *Ireland*, and for urging the neceſſity of the Interpoſition of the King's Authority, where the Letter of the Law was too ſevere upon his Subjects. And I could name the Perſon, who in Vindication of the Barbarity of the Kentiſh Men to a certain Perſon in Diſtreſs, urged his putting an Act in execution in thoſe parts, than which, ſcarce any thing more tended to the Advancement of our Trade, as even he, who urged it, had formerly acknowledged. Thus ſome people will make even Health it ſelf to be a Diſeaſe.

Now, if we are not well qualified to judge of the Evil, we are ſtill more unfit to be Judges of the Remedy. For it is a Madneſs to prate of applying a Cure to we know not what. But to put a ſtop here; he ſuppoſes Caſes wherein the Supreme Governour may be a Party, and therefore not to be allowed to be Judge in his own Caſe; But then will not his Subjects be a Party too? And if they in this Caſe muſt be allowed to be Judge over the Supreme Governour, What is this but to ſet a Supreme above a Supreme, whilſt he himſelf grants, *That the Supreme Governour has no Supreme*? But it is an idle if not a wicked Thing to ſuppoſe ſuch Caſes without proving them, when ſuch Suppoſals are made the Reaſon of their Actions: For at this rate no Government can be long-liv'd. When that is proved to be the Caſe, it is then time enough to diſcourſe of what may be done by the Intreaties and Petitions of the People, and the Mediation of co-ordinate Powers, in order to ſet things to Rights. But let his Author ſay never ſo plainly, *That he doth not ſet up the Power of the People over Kings*, yet his Principles do; and Men act by thoſe, whatever they may pretend or ſay to the contrary.

As to what concerns a *Body of Men*, he puts theſe two Queſtions from his Author. *Whether the Law of our Nation doth not bind us to Allegiance to a King and Queen in actual Poſſeſſion of the Throne by conſent of the three Eſtates of the Realm? And whether ſuch an Oath may not lawfully be taken, notwithſtanding any former Oath?* The affirmative he proves from *the Conſent of the People, whoſe true Repreſentatives, (* as he ſays) *they are*, I need not here examine of what Force is the Conſent of the People, becauſe the Foundation whereon he Grounds it, as to our preſent Caſe, is falſe: For the three Eſtates of the Realm are the King's three Eſtates, and they can neither be legal Eſtates, nor legal Repreſentatives without the King's Authority, Writs, and Summons, and other Requiſites. But, it ſeems, the Inquirer here put an unlucky Queſtion. *Where or how can all the People meet?* Which he ſcornfully thus Anſwers. *As if the Author he oppoſes thought of no leſs than the numbering of the People from* Dan *to* Beerſheba. But if he did not think of numbering them from *Dan* to *Beerſheba*, he ought to have thought of numbering them from *Barwick* to *Dover*. For if the Government was not diſſolved, Why goes it not according to the Conſtitution? If it was diſſolved, than all Men were as free as it is poſſible for Men to be; and then no Man could repreſent another without his expreſs Conſent; and every ones Conſent ought to be taken *Viritim*; for whoſoever did not give his Conſent, did not come into your new Body, and his natural Freedom could not without Injuſtice be taken from him by Force.

When I thought we had been near an end, he is got again to the begining; and when he was *thinking of cloſing*, in the very next Words, he propounds no leſs than three Heads of Diſcourſe, which, he ſays, his *Author treated of towards the begining*; but all amount to no more, but the old Cuckoo Note of Publick Good, and that it ought to over-rule every thing; as to which I might briefly Anſwer, That Publick Good is to be promoted in the way of Duty, not out of it; and this is very ill taken up for a Plea, where there is neither Publick Good nor Duty in the Matter they plead for. But he undertakes to prove the Matter by Inſtances, only they are Inſtances which have been already Anſwered, and he doth not handle them ſo dexterouſly as his Author. He begins with Parents and Childeren, an unlucky Omen: *If* (ſaith he) *a Vow*

to

to God (which is as solemn a Thing as an Oath) hinders that good, which Children are bound to do to Parents, it ceaseth to oblige, as our Saviour declares: Very good. But the reason is, because that Vow never obliged at all, as being unlawful, and contrary to that which God and Nature had made a Duty of Childeren to Parents, though Wicked or Froward. I thought the Duty of Children to Parents had been Abdicated; at least, Sir, you ought to have overlook'd it. But I desire it may be observed, That, to make amends for this oversight, this very Author, who here makes the Duty of Childeren to Parents so Sacred that it makes void a Vow to God himself, within 3 Pages next following teacheth you a trick to vacate the Obligation of the Fifth Commandment.

But it seems I had said, That this was nothing to the purpose, and I think I there proved it: But he says, *it is to the purpose*, because *if the procuring and preserving the Publick Good be a Duty, and what a Person hath vowed or sworn be destructive of it, then the Oath cannot oblige, no more than a Vow*, &c. (*p.* 28.) But I say this also is nothing to the Purpose. For though the procuring and preserving the publick Good be a Duty, yet it doth not make every thing a Duty, which may tend towards it; and it must be procured and preserved only by means lawful and honest. If Children might murther their Parents for the Publick Good, such Parents as have large Estates and wicked Children, had need look out sharp; for Pretences, even of Publick Good, would not long be wanting to send them of an Errand to another World.

Whereas I had said, with respect to such Oath or Vow, That *the Sin was in making*, &c. he says this is true, *where the Matter is unlawful in it self*, but not where *the Obligation comes to cease*. And this I grant also to be true; but then a Man ought to be very well assured that the Obligation doth cease, for otherwise all the Arts and Shifts in the world will not absolve him from Perjury. And I insisted on the first, as being our Case; and therefore his Instance of the *Shew-bread* is beside the Matter: For though, as dedicated to God, it belonged to the Priests, yet it was never unlawful in it self for a Man to eat Bread; nor did such Dedication hinder the Priests from being Charitable, and in case of necessity, relieving a good Man from being starved. And though it be the fashion of our days, not only to make Men poor, but by all means possible to hinder them from any Relief, that they may starve; yet he needed not to have gone to the *Jews* for an Instance, but might have told us of Christian Bishops, who in times of Famine have sold the Riches of their Churches, to buy Food for the Poor; and Posterity hath honoured their Memory for it. As for his Story of *Jaddus*, I will not trouble my self to call it in question; it will be somewhat to the Purpose when he can prove these three things, 1. That *Jaddus* and the *Jews* took an Oath to *Alexander*: I find no such thing in the Story; and he knows that we do not deny all manner of Submission to Force. 2. That *Darius* was living when *Jaddus* made the Submission. 3. That we have the same Authority, Warrant, and Directions, which *Jaddus* and the *Jews* had; as to which last, he may do very well to address himself to a certain Person, whom he very well knows, and try if he can find it in the *Revelations*.

The next Instance is of *the Parents Part to Children*, as to which he cites these words from his Author; *If Parents, instead of regarding the Good of their Children, do openly design their Ruine, none will say but that they are bound to take Care of their own Welfare*. They are so; but yet even then there is a Duty owing from those Children to those Parents. But in order to take off my Answer there given, as if he had received a double Portion of *Hugh Peters*'s Spirit, he falls to his blackening Arts, and with the help of Flam-Suppositals and notorious Falshoods, represents as indulgent a Father as perhaps lived, as if he were another *Saturn*, who devoured his own Issue; and then he thinks the Child *may enter upon the Estate, and keep Possession against his Parent*, &c. and then tryumphantly asks this question, *May not all this be done, and the Fifth Commandment stand in its full Force?* Yes, Sir! the Fifth Commandment will be in force, and you and others, some time or other, will find so; but as you order the Matter here, you make it either of no Force, or of Force to very ill purpose; for so I take it to be, when it lays no other Obligation upon the Child, but

but to diſpoſſeſs the Father of his Eſtate, or to knock out his Brains. Do not you think you have done an Heroick Act, thus to diſpute away the fifth Cammannment? But at this rate, I am afraid you will paint *White-Chapel* black, and make People doubtful, how he is a Preacher of Righteouſneſs, who deviſes Tricks to take away the Obligation of God's Commandments.

The third Inſtance is of *Maſters and Servants, Victors and Captives; and in theſe* (his Author ſays) *there is a Regard had to the Benefit of thoſe, who are in Subjection.* This I did grant, but withall deny, That any Conſequence could be drawn thence, which would be for his turn. But here he accuſeth me of Ignorance, Nonſenſe, Blunders, and what not, and all along after ſpeaks in ſuch inſolent language, as I think is only fit to be deſpiſed; and therefore I will not do him the Pleaſure to take any farther notice of it: Only I think it diſingenuous to cite my Words by the halves, and then cry out of *Nonſenſe and Inconſiſtencies.* But it was impudence, aſſoon as this was done, to repeat the following Words, which both make them Senſe, and take away all Inconſiſtency. But to my Argument he anſwers, *That being under Government* (*rightly ſo called,*) *doth not Metamorphoſe us into Beaſts; yet mere abſolute Power comes very near it.* I know not what he means by his *Government* (*rightly ſo called;*) I hope it is not Uſurpation. That Parentheſis would better have become another, than him. But his Anſwer is neither to the purpoſe, nor true: For there neither is nor can be any Government, but ſomewhere there is lodg'd in it that, which he calls *an abſolute Power*; and thus in his way of Arguing, he hath near *Metamorphoſed* all Mankind into Beaſts, unleſs there be any ſuch as are under no Government at all. I as heartily wiſh, as he or any other Man can, That Power may be well uſed; and yet I think I ought to be content to allow my Governours their Failings, without mutinying againſt them, and diſplacing them: This would be, not only endleſs, but to condemn our ſelves; for if it were ſaid to us, *he that is without Sin, let him caſt the firſt ſtone*, I doubt you would ſcarce find one to begin the Work. His Diſtinction of a *private Injury* from that *wherein the Publick is concerned*, is not practicable upon his Principle: For let it be made lawful on any account to depoſe the ſupream Governour, and the leaſt and moſt private Injury imaginable ſhall be interpreted a Breach of the Subjects Privilege in general, and conſequently againſt the Publick Good. But there will be no need for this, according to his Principle. For if the *antecedent Good* (as he calls it) *be ſo the Meaſure of the Obligation, as to diſſolve it*, when that is wanting, every Man will be prone to think his own particular Good to be as much that antecedent Good, as any thing he can call publick; and conſequently if he be wronged, will take himſelf to be abſolved from his Allegiance. This is an admirable way to make Government firm and ſtable.

The laſt Relation he mentions is between Princes and their Subjects, as to which, the only material thing he ſays, is, *That the Nature of Political Oaths is ſuch, that they are reciprocal.* Now though I do not think this will hold, yet to what purpoſe ſhould I enter into a Diſcourſe about Oaths, when our Buſineſs is with the Duties, which were antecedent to the Oaths, and to the Performance of which we are more ſtrongly bound by thoſe Oaths! Theſe undoubtedly are not reciprocal: For if the Subject will not do his Duty, or abſolutely deny it, doth this deprive the King of his Right to Sovereignty? At this rate indeed we may depoſe Kings, and transfer Allegiance at pleaſure. It were a very happy thing, if the Duties of Relations were always juſtly and mutually paid; but if there be (as too often there is) a Failure on the one part, it doth not diſcharge the Obligations of the other. Children owe a Duty to wicked Parents, Servants to hard Maſters, Subjects to ſevere Kings; though it were much better, if they had more Encouragement to perform their Obligations.

Every Cur will be ſnarling at the dead Lyon, whom otherwiſe he durſt not look in the Face. The Actions, Writings, and Reputation of Dr. *Hammond* and Biſhop *Sanderſon*, were enough to blaſt theſe Proceedings; and therefore almoſt every Scribler for the late Treachery doth all he can to leſſen their Eſteem in the World. I had particular occaſion

ſion to vindicate Biſhop *Sanderſon*; but he tells me I miſtake between *what the Conſent of the abſent Prince is founded upon, and upon what the Caſuiſts found their Opinion of the Obligation that lies on Mankind to do what tends to the Publick Good under a Uſurpation*; and this he calls teaching me *A. B. C.* and indeed I think he is much fitter to teach *A. B. C.* than ſo great a Congregation, unleſs he had more Conſcience and Honeſty. However, I will not learn my *A. B. C.* of him, if it were only for this Reaſon, that I have no mind to learn it backward. But if he pleaſe to look into his Author again, with a more impartial Eye, he will find that he invidiouſly and maliciouſly endeavours to charge and undervalue Biſhop *Sanderſon*, as founding the Actions of Subjects under a Uſurpation on ſuch a Reaſon as other Caſuiſts did not; and as if he made the preſumptive Will of the Prince the ſole Reaſon: And in this Caſe, I think I had Reaſon to urge, That he founded the preſumptive Conſent of the Prince upon the Publick Good; and I ſhall not willingly ſuffer ſo great a Perſon to be ſcandalized, let him put his *B*'s and *C*'s how he will.

The laſt Head he propounds is *of Obedience to Authority*, which if it had been more thought of, and better obſerved, there had been no occaſion to diſpute about it now: And I wonder with what face thoſe Men can name *Obedience to Authority*, who make it their whole Buſineſs to juſtifie Diſobedience to Authority. Here, after ſome little Wit, and much trifling, and the Charge of ſome Miſtakes upon me, which I think might be eaſily returned, but I will not ſpend time about it, becauſe they come not up to the Caſe; at laſt he replies to my Anſwer concerning the Caſe of the *Jews*: And this is the only thing material he offers under this Head. My firſt Anſwer, *That the Jews being governed by one of their own Brethren was deſigned as a Bleſſing, the contrary was a Judgment*, he doth not deny: But he would thence infer this Conſequence, *That therefore they might not lawfully tranſfer their Allegiance from their own Blood to a Foreigner*. And this he thinks he can prove falſe. But I do not know how that Conſequence follows from my Words. The *Jews* ſpontaniouſly, wantonly, and by their own Authority, could not tranſfer their Allegiance; but when God, for their Sins, deprived them of a particular Privilege and Bleſſing, and put them under the Power of others, and they knew it was his Will it ſhould be ſo; they were then bound to obey. And thus *Nehemiah* might ſerve as *Governour under* Artaxerxes, *and* Jaddus *take an Oath of Fidelity to* Darius. And hence you ſee on *what Right the Oath was founded.*

Next I urged, that they were under a ſtate of Conqueſt, this he doth neither deny, nor own it to be our Caſe; and unleſs he doth this latter, whatever he infers thence, whether true or falſe, cannot affect us. And therefore I am not further concerned to anſwer a Man, who labours to make acts of Violence to be ſtanding Rules for all Seaſons.

In the third place I did (as he ſays) urge, *That the Queſtion to our Saviour was not concerning Oaths, but Tribute, which he grants all Caſuiſts do allow may be paid, even to an Uſurper.* But then he ſays, *I know what Uſe, and what Gain too, my Adverſary made of this.* But if he made an ill Uſe of it, how can I help it? Muſt I Anſwer for that? As for his Gain, if he mean a Biſhoprick, it is ſomething; but as to the Merits of the Cauſe I cannot ſee, that he hath Gained any thing. But after all, both the Uſe an Gain is an Argument borrowed from Dr. *Burnet*, which runs to this purpoſe; if Submiſſion may be teſtified one way, why not another? If Tribute may be paid, why not promiſed? If promiſed, why not ſworn? And then he asks, *Is it not as a Token of Allegeance?* The Anſwer is plain. I may ſubmit wherein it may be done lawfully, but not wherein it is unlawful. I may pay Money to a Thief, I may promiſe it, yea ſuch may be my Streights and Dangers, that I may ſwear to do it; and yet this is not as a Token of Allegiance, which all that time is due to my King, and ought not to be made over to a Thief; it is the Redemption of my Life, or Goods, and the chooſing a leſs Evil rather than a greater in a caſe, wherein I may do it without Sin. For in ſuch caſe, I think, I may lawfully part with my own, though it is unlawful for the other to take it. And if this Anſwer will not pleaſe him, he may ſtill call me Fool, as he here

here doth; I like the Title much better than Knave, though I am fond of neither.

Laſtly, With reſpect to *Tiberius* it was urged, that no Man had *jus potius*, and that there was no prior Oaths in bar againſt him; as to which he Anſwers, That *Agrippa Poſthumus was then living, one much nearer to* Auguſtus, *and that ſeem'd deſigned by him to ſucceed him.* What he means by *ſeem'd deſigned* I cannot tell. Was he really deſigned, or not? It is a common thing for Relations to waver in their Thoughts, which way they ſhall beſtow their Favours, and ſometimes it is a piece of Art; but if *Tiberius was deſigned* (as he calls it) *at laſt*, the Cauſe is ſo far caſt. But becauſe this will not do, he ſays, That *there was a* jus potius *in the Senate, from whom even* Auguſtus *was willing to receive it.* But if *Auguſtus*, who was before *Tiberius*, did receive the Senates Right, then their Right was gone before *Tiberius*'s time, and ſo the *jus potius* is good on his ſide ſtill. Beſide by their own Laws they might make a Dictator, and they had actually made *Julius Cæſar* perpetual Dictator, who was before them both, and in that very act gave away their Power; ſo that their giving up to *Auguſtus*, was but Selling their Eſtate twice. And after all, his Author confeſſes they ſwore Allegiance to *Tiberius*; and where was then their *jus potius*? As to the prior Oaths he asks me, *What I think of the Oath of* Jaddus *to* Darius, *&c.*? And in requital I ask him again, What is that in bar to the Title of *Tiberius*? So that if *Tiberius* was as bad a Man as he repreſents him, (and indeed I never thought him a Saint, though for his Art in Diſſimulation he might have been qualified for one in theſe times) yet in ſpite of our Author his Title will prove the beſt he can ſet up.

As to the better Title, which he ſaith he *will adventure to ſet before me*, he may keep it to himſelf; he hath offered his Ware to a wrong Chapman: But for his Kindneſs I will leave him this Remark, That when the Children of *Iſrael* forſook the living God to worſhip Graven Images, the greater part were always more zealous for their Idols than for the true God.

In the Concluſion I find, that our Author is ſupoſitious of the force of his Arguments; for he will not leave me to *the Tribunal of Heaven*, but threatens me with being *called to account here*, and I do not queſtion but that he will do his endeavour, nor do I crave any Favour at his Hands: He that calls me to Sufferings, I hope will enable me to bear them; and in ſuch caſe I have no other Remedy, but to appeal to the juſt God, before whom one Day we ſhall have a Rehearing. And when it comes to my Thoughts how a Turk at *Buda*, laying his Hand on his Breſt, promiſed not to yield up the Town but with his Life, and in purſuance of his Word ſo Manfully defended it, that it coſt a victorious Army dear, and took up almoſt two Summers Work, and when the Place was Untenable any longer might have made honourable Conditions, yet rather than break his Promiſe, choſe to ſtand in the Breach, in his Drawers, and tempt and defie Death; it amazeth me to think, who ſhall riſe up in Judgment againſt this Treacherous and Perfidious Generation. *O God of Goodneſs and Compaſſion! in the midſt of Judgment think on Mercy, have Pity upon this poor diſtreſſed Church, and give Men a Senſe of that Simplicity, Sincerity, and Integrity, which thy Law ſo highly extols and ſtrictly requires of all who call themſelves Chriſtians.*

F I N I S.